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CONTRACT DESIGN AND THE
STRUCTURE OF CONTRACTUAL INTENT
JODY S. KRAUS† & ROBERT E. SCOTT‡
Modern contract law is governed by a two-stage adjudicative regime—an inheri-
tance of the centuries-old conflict between law and equity.  Under this regime,
formal contract terms are treated as prima facie provisions that courts can override
by invoking equitable doctrines so as to substantially “correct” the parties’ contract
by realigning it with their contractual intent.  This ex post judicial determination of
the contractual obligation serves as a fallback mechanism for vindicating the par-
ties’ contractual intent whenever the formal contract terms fall short of achieving
the parties’ purposes.  Honoring the contractual intent of the parties is thus the cen-
tral objective of contract law.  Yet little scholarly attention has been given to the
structure of contractual intent.  Courts naturally equate contractual intent with the
parties’ contractual objectives, which we call the “contractual ends” of their collab-
oration.  But reaching agreement on a shared objective is only the first step to
designing an enforceable contract.  Thereafter, the parties must create the particular
rights and duties that will serve as their “contractual means” for achieving their
shared ends.  The thesis of this Article argues that the current regime of contract
adjudication conflates the parties’ contractual means with their contractual ends.  In
so doing, it reduces the range of contractual arrangements to which contract law
gives effect, thereby potentially depriving commercially sophisticated parties of
essential tools for contract design.  Sophisticated actors engage in ex ante determi-
nations of their means of enforcement, choosing whether enforcement is to be either
legal or relational and whether legal enforcement should rely on either rules or
standards.  Both theory and available evidence suggest that such parties would
prefer a default rule that strictly enforces formal contract doctrine unless they have
expressly indicated their intent to delegate hindsight authority to a court.  By elimi-
nating the risk that courts will erroneously infer the parties’ preference for ex post
judicial intervention, such a regime increases the reliability of formal contract terms
and enhances the parties’ control over the content of their contract.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
I. LAW AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW . . . . . . 1033
A. The Historical Origins of Law and Equity . . . . . . . . . . 1035
1. The Creation of Courts of Law and Equity . . . . . 1035
2. The Contrasting Approaches of Law and
Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
† Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy,
University of Virginia.
‡ Alfred McCormack Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Contract and
Economic Organization, Columbia University.  We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Richard
Craswell, Mel Eisenberg, Victor Goldberg, Avery Katz, Greg Klass, Dan Klerman, Paul
Mahoney, Alex Raskolnikov, Alan Schwartz, Rip Verkerke, and participants at workshop
presentations at the Northwestern University School of Law, the University of Virginia
School of Law, and the American Law and Economics Association for helpful comments
on prior drafts.  Copyright © 2009 by Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott.
1023
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402846
1024 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1023
B. The Legal and Equitable Roots of American
Contract Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
II. LEGAL AND RELATIONAL MEANS OF EFFECTING
CONTRACTUAL ENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046
A. Contractual Interpretation and Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046
1. The Function of Doctrines of Interpretation . . . . . 1046
2. Hunt Foods v. Doliner:  The Parol Evidence
Rule and Relational Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048
a. The Court’s Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
b. Contractual Ends Trump the Rules of
Interpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
B. A Contract Design Explanation of the Hunt Foods-
Doliner Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
1. Reconstructing the Parties’ Motivations . . . . . . . . . . 1053
2. The Costs of Conflating Contractual Intent with
the Parties’ Contractual Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
III. RULES AND STANDARDS AS MEANS TO EFFECT
CONTRACTUAL ENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062
A. Contractual Intent and the Law of Mistake and
Excuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
1. The ALCOA-Essex Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
2. The Litigation in ALCOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
3. The Ex Post Justification:  Honoring the Parties’
Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
B. A Contract Design Explanation of the ALCOA-
Essex Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
1. Reframing the Question of Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
2. The Choice of Contractual Means:  Rules Versus
Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
3. Determining the Chosen Contractual Means . . . . . 1073
IV. CONDITIONS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF EXPRESS
TERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
A. The Tension over the Interpretation of Express
Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
B. The Schizophrenic Law of Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
C. Express Conditions of Satisfaction: Corthell v.
Summit Thread Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
1. The Corthell-Summit Thread Contract . . . . . . . . . . 1085
2. The Court’s Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
3. A Contract Design Explanation:  Conditions and
Relational Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
D. Excuse of Conditions and Rules Versus Standards . . . 1094
E. A Final Equitable Override:  Waiver of Conditions . . 1097
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402846
October 2009] CONTRACT DESIGN AND CONTRACTUAL INTENT 1025
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101
INTRODUCTION
Modern contract law is governed by a two-stage adjudicative
regime—an inheritance of the centuries-old conflict between law and
equity.  Under this regime, formal contract terms are treated as prima
facie provisions that courts can override by invoking equitable doc-
trines if they believe that doing so is necessary to substantially “cor-
rect” the parties’ contract by realigning it with their contractual intent.
For example, if the parties’ objective is to provide the seller a three
percent profit, they might specify a term that requires the buyer to pay
the seller a price equal to three percent above a published industry
price index.  If the seller claims it is entitled to more than three per-
cent above the published price index, a court would first apply formal
contract doctrine to determine the price term of the agreement.1
However, if a court believes that the published price index severely
underrepresents the seller’s actual costs, it can invoke an equitable
doctrine to override the formal contract price term and to substitute a
price term it believes more accurately represents the seller’s true
costs.2  This ex post judicial determination of the contractual obliga-
tion serves as a fallback mechanism for vindicating the parties’ intent
whenever a court determines that the formal contract terms fall seri-
ously short of achieving the parties’ purposes.  In short, under the cur-
rent adjudicative regime, every contract by default comes with a
judicial insurance policy against formal contract terms that, in the
court’s view, turn out to have ill-served the parties’ intentions.
Honoring the contractual intent of the parties is the central objec-
tive of contract law.3  Yet despite its theoretical and doctrinal cen-
1 In this Article, we characterize as formal any American contract doctrine that
originated in the legal rules developed and strictly enforced by English common law courts.
We will refer to the terms that a court would find by the standard application of formal
contract doctrine to the evidence of the parties’ agreement as the formal contract terms.
Thus, the formal contract price term in this example is three percent above the published
price index; the parties appear to have chosen this term, rather than a term directly enti-
tling the seller to its actual costs plus three percent, as their contractual means of achieving
their contractual end (providing the seller with a three percent profit). See infra pp.
119–21 (defining “formal contract law”).
2 We characterize as equitable any American contract doctrine that originated from
the principles developed and enforced by the English Court of Chancery.  The historical
purpose of these doctrines was to allow the chancellor to circumvent or override the
common law rules whenever he believed doing so was necessary to avoid injustice.  In the
case of contracts, these doctrines typically treat as unjust any outcome that is dramatically
misaligned with the parties’ contractual ends. See infra pp. 119–22 (defining “equitable
contract law”).
3 The search for intention is a key doctrinal element in determining whether the par-
ties have made a binding agreement, the meaning that attaches to the terms of that agree-
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trality, little scholarly attention has been given to the structure of
contractual intent.4  Courts naturally equate contractual intent with
the parties’ contractual objectives, which we will call the contractual
ends of their collaboration.  But reaching agreement on a shared
objective is only the first step to designing an enforceable contract.
Thereafter, the parties must create the particular rights and duties that
will serve as their contractual means for achieving their shared ends.5
The thesis of this Article is that the current regime of contract adjudi-
cation conflates the parties’ contractual means with their contractual
ends.  In so doing, it reduces the range of contractual arrangements to
which contract law gives effect, thereby potentially depriving commer-
cially sophisticated parties of essential tools for contract design.
Sophisticated actors engage in ex ante determinations of their means
of enforcement, choosing whether enforcement is to be legal or rela-
tional and whether legal enforcement should rely on rules or stan-
dards.  We argue, therefore, that commercially sophisticated parties
would prefer a regime in which courts apply formal doctrine exclu-
sively, unless at the time of formation the parties have expressly indi-
cated their desire for courts to apply equitable doctrine as well.6
Our claim that sophisticated parties would prefer courts to honor
their formal contract terms even when doing so will frustrate their
contractual ends may appear to be unsupportable either in theory or
in practice.  After all, the contemporary two-stage regime for contract
adjudication rests on the natural and powerful intuition that most par-
ties, including commercially sophisticated ones, would prefer courts to
take advantage of their hindsight in assisting the parties to achieve
ment, the default terms implied in that agreement, and whether the obligations of the
parties are impliedly conditioned on unstated assumptions or expressly conditioned on
stated events.  In addition, the obligation to honor the intention of the parties is the key
linkage between efficiency and autonomy, two of the major theoretical approaches to con-
tract. ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 23–29 (4th ed.
2007).
4 A recent exception to the lack of sustained analysis of the nature of contractual
intent is Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2009).
5 These rights and duties comprise the contract terms that determine how and whether
the parties must perform their contractual obligations as well as the consequences of
nonperformance.
6 For a precise definition of “sophisticated economic actors” that limits the category to
limited partnerships, professional partnerships, and firms organized in corporate form with
five or more employees, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003).  In principle, our thesis might also
be applied to contracts between commercially unsophisticated parties or between commer-
cially sophisticated and unsophisticated parties.  But defending an extension of our thesis
to such cases would require additional analysis to take into account a range of considera-
tions, such as legal information asymmetry, cognitive error, and nonrepeat play contexts,
which we do not undertake here.
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their contractual ends.7  Indeed, had the parties known at the time of
formation what the court knows at the time of adjudication, the par-
ties themselves would have crafted different terms.  It appears to
follow that the parties would prefer courts to do for them in the
course of adjudication what the parties would have done for them-
selves at the time of formation had they known what the court knows.
It would seem perverse for a court to insist on holding parties to terms
that it knows the parties themselves would have rejected.  To hold par-
ties to their formal contract terms when those terms no longer (or
never did) constitute reasonable means of achieving the parties’
intended contractual ends would exalt formal doctrine over substance.
As compelling as it seems, however, this justification of the two-
stage regime of contract adjudication rests on the unsupported pre-
mise that contract law should identify the parties’ contractual intent
with their intended ends rather than their intended means.  Some-
times the only way to maintain fidelity to the parties’ contractual
intent is to enforce the formal contract terms to which they agreed,
even when doing so defeats their contractual ends.  To return to the
example above, by specifying an industry index to determine the
seller’s costs, the parties might have intended to reject recourse to
judicial hindsight in order to increase the certainty of their contract
price.  The parties might believe that the benefits of judicial hindsight
are outweighed by the gains in the reliability of the deal and the
decrease in expected litigation costs.  When one party claims that the
index has not functioned as expected, it invites a court to second-guess
the contract’s formal price term.  But it seems likely that the parties
here specified an objective price index precisely to avoid the costs of a
judicial inquiry into its accuracy.  Therefore, to entertain such an
inquiry would perversely defeat the parties’ contractual intent by
undermining the very means they chose to achieve their contractual
ends.  Judicial intervention to “correct” this contract by realigning the
price term with the seller’s actual costs thus would vindicate the par-
ties’ contractual ends at the expense of undermining their chosen
means.  A regime that embraces such intervention impairs the ability
7 Ex ante, parties have limited knowledge of the present and are uncertain about the
future.  Therefore, in order to decide on their particular contractual obligations, the parties
must make assumptions about their present and future circumstances.  Yet they also know
that new information that comes to light during the term of their contract may reveal that
their assumptions were erroneous.  This justification for the two-stage regime thus rests on
the premise that, by delegating to courts the historically equitable authority to modify
formal contract terms, the parties can both rely on their formal contract terms but also rest
safe in the assurance that, if their assumptions turn out to be false, a court will set aside the
formal contract terms and craft substitute terms that better serve the parties’ initial con-
tractual ends in light of the new information available to the court.
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of parties in the future to rely on proxies such as a price index in lieu
of an ex post judicial inquiry into actual costs.
The two-stage regime thus ultimately destroys the distinction
between the parties’ contractual means and ends.  It presumes that all
parties want courts to advert directly to the parties’ contractual ends
to determine their contractual rights and duties.  But there is good
reason to doubt that commercially sophisticated parties typically, let
alone always, prefer this method of vindicating their contractual
intent.  Both theory and available evidence suggest that parties would
prefer a regime that strictly enforces formal contract doctrine (unless
they have expressly indicated their intent to delegate hindsight
authority to a court) over a default rule that automatically subordi-
nates formal contract doctrine to ex post judicial revision.8  By elimi-
nating the risk that courts will erroneously infer the parties’
preference for ex post judicial intervention, such a regime increases
the reliability of formal contract terms and enhances the parties’ con-
trol over the content of their contract.  That control, in turn, permits
sophisticated commercial parties to implement the most efficient con-
tract design strategies available to them.
In this Article, we develop a theory of contract design that
explains why commercially sophisticated parties would prefer a
regime that delegates to them complete discretion over the methods
for determining the specific content of their contractual obligations.
We begin with the premise that in the absence of contracting costs,
commercial parties would seek to maximize the expected joint gains
from contracting by specifying unambiguously each party’s perform-
ance obligations in all possible future states of the world.  However,
parties face two obstacles to writing such “complete contingent con-
tracts”:  front-end transaction costs and back-end enforcement costs.
Collectively, these comprise the costs of contracting.  The first axiom
of our theory of contract design is that contracting parties are moti-
vated to select those contracting mechanisms that will best achieve
their objectives at the least cost.  Parties economize on contracting
costs in two distinct ways:  by choosing between legal and relational
means of enforcement9 and by shifting costs between the front end
8 The core of our argument supporting the claim that commercial parties prefer courts
to adhere to formal contract terms absent an express indication otherwise is based on a
theory of contract design explicated in Parts II and III, infra.  Our theory of contract
design explains why commercial parties must be able to anticipate and control what por-
tions of their agreements will be legally enforceable and the extent to which their agree-
ments will be governed by rules ex ante or standards ex post.  For empirical support for the
predictions of the theory, see infra notes 148–50, 194–98, 276–78 and accompanying text.
9 The literature has long recognized two complementary perspectives on enforcement.
On the one hand, prospective litigation encourages compliance with those bargains that
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and the back end of the contracting process when drafting legally
enforceable agreements.10
Consider first the tradeoff between legal and relational enforce-
ment.  In experimental settings, legal enforcement has been shown to
undermine relational norms based on reputation, repeated dealings,
and reciprocity.  This research has demonstrated that, in many
instances, these relational mechanisms operate as substitutes, rather
than as complements, for legal enforcement.11  Moreover, the rela-
tional mechanisms that may be displaced by a system of legal enforce-
ment are often less costly and more effective than the legal
alternative.  In particular, relational mechanisms for motivating per-
formance of contractual obligations are likely to be optimal whenever
key information is observable but not easily verifiable:  The parties
themselves can obtain the information at reasonable cost, but the
costs of proving it to a third-party adjudicator exceed the gains from
legal enforcement.12  To be sure, in some circumstances legal enforce-
ment may be preferable even though it undermines relational norms.
satisfy the prerequisites for legal enforcement.  On the other hand, parties also face an
array of informal or “relational” sanctions if they fail to honor their commitments.  In
many cases, these relational sanctions may do much of the enforcement work.  See
ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN:  CONTRACT THEORY
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 84–109 (2006) (discussing choice
between formal and informal enforcement); see generally Robert E. Scott, Conflict and
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987) [hereinafter Scott,
Conflict and Cooperation] (discussing potency of relational sanctions as means of enforcing
agreements that are not legally enforceable); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003) [hereinafter Scott, Self-Enforcing
Agreements] (same).  We discuss the tradeoff between formal and relational enforcement
in Part II.B, infra.
10 For discussion, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 822–51 (2006).
11 See Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, supra note 9, at 1670–72 (describing experi-
ments showing that reciprocal fairness rather than explicit sanctions can be used as
enforcement device); Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International
Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 579–80 [hereinafter Scott &
Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements] (discussing experiments suggesting that
coercion undermines reciprocity).
12 There is no sharp dichotomy between verifiable and nonverifiable conditions.  As we
discuss in detail in Part II.B.1, infra, the question is whether the benefits of using informal
norms to enforce a difficult-to-prove condition (such as the level of effort needed to
comply with a contractual commitment) are greater than the alternative of verifying com-
pliance with a less accurate but more easily established proxy for the condition in question.
The important point, however, is that informal enforcement mechanisms can take into
account conditions that are hard to verify even where legal enforcement cannot.  For
example, parties to an agreement often can observe whether one party has exercised “best
efforts” to perform its obligation, but it will be quite costly to marshal the evidence neces-
sary to demonstrate this fact to a disinterested third party.  Where this is true, exclusive
reliance on legal enforcement can deprive parties of relational mechanisms that can pro-
mote better compliance at a lower cost.
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The complexity of particular transactions may make it difficult for
either the parties or casual observers to determine confidently
whether a party has departed from the agreed course of conduct, but
the information necessary to make that decision may subsequently be
provable to a court at reasonable cost.  In such cases, the threat of a
legally enforceable sanction might deter opportunistic behavior and
clarify the parties’ actions and responsibilities.  This calculus of rela-
tive costs and benefits often motivates parties to partition their agree-
ments into legally enforceable and unenforceable components.  A
court that breaches the resulting barrier in order to vindicate the par-
ties’ contractual ends undermines the efficacy of this first choice of
contractual means.
When parties decide to make some or all of their agreement
legally enforceable, they face a choice among contractual means that
further optimize contracting costs.  By choosing between vague or
precise contract terms, the parties can thereby shift costs between the
back and front end of the contracting process.13  When the parties
agree to vague terms, such as the obligation to use their best efforts,
the subsequent adjudication of contractual disputes concerning best
efforts will require a court to give concrete and specific meaning to
the vague phrase as part of the process of interpretation.  By framing
their agreement in vague terms, the parties embed their legal obliga-
tions in broad standards that delegate discretion to courts ex post and
thereby increase back-end enforcement costs.  However, this strategy
saves the parties the costs of specifying precise performance obliga-
tions at the time of formation.  Moreover, because the court will have
information that was not available to the parties at the time of forma-
tion, it potentially allows the parties to benefit from more efficient
performance standards than they could have specified at the time of
formation.14
Alternatively, when the parties agree to precise terms, such as the
obligation to pay for a fixed quantity of goods at a price determined
by a specified index, the parties reduce the need for a court to inter-
pret the terms of the contract.  Precise terms reduce legal obligations
to bright-line rules that specify the content of the obligation ex ante.
Rules withdraw authority from courts to determine particular per-
formance obligations and instead direct them to enforce the formal
obligations that the parties have explicitly specified in advance.  Par-
13 We discuss the tradeoffs between ex ante rules and ex post standards in contract
design in Part III.B.2, infra.
14 See Scott & Triantis, supra note 10, at 845 (“Given the court’s superior information,
the parties can expect that one or both of the proxies will be less noisy [at the time of trial]
than the one that the parties would pick ex ante.”).
October 2009] CONTRACT DESIGN AND CONTRACTUAL INTENT 1031
ties might do this because they are better informed than courts about
their contractual purposes and have better incentives to pursue them
efficiently.  This strategy, however, does require the parties to rely on
estimates of the likelihood of various future events rather than the
actual knowledge of those events that would be available to a court at
a later date.  If those estimates turn out to be erroneous, a court may
be tempted to realign the contract terms with the parties’ original con-
tractual ends.  But only if courts faithfully enforce the precise terms,
notwithstanding subsequent frustration, can parties choose ex ante
between precise and vague terms as the best means to achieve their
particular contractual ends.15
Our theory of contract design thus explains why commercial par-
ties need to anticipate and control what portions of their agreements
will be legally enforceable and the extent to which their agreements
will be governed by ex ante rules or ex post standards.16  When faith-
fully applied, formal contract doctrine provides parties with precisely
this control.  In the discussion that follows, we consider a number of
examples where courts apply formal doctrine in a nonstandard fashion
or invoke historically equitable doctrines to override formal doctrine
when they perceive that enforcing the parties’ formal contract terms
would defeat the parties’ contractual ends.  In particular, we analyze
how courts interpret the parol evidence and integration doctrines, the
mistake and excuse doctrines, and the law of conditions and waiver in
order to avoid adjudicative outcomes that they perceive to be mis-
aligned with the parties’ contractual ends.  Our aim is not to demon-
strate that the court in any particular case necessarily reached an
improper result.  After all, these contracts were formed against the
backdrop of the current two-stage regime of contract adjudication.
These parties thus may have designed their contracts on the assump-
tion that a court might advert to equitable doctrine and reasoning.  On
this question, we claim only that, contrary to the courts’ reasoning, the
formal terms of these contracts cannot be dismissed on the ground
that they are at odds with any rational or reasonable understanding of
the parties’ contractual intent.  Our principal objective, therefore, is to
15 The parties’ objective is to select that combination of precise rules and vague stan-
dards that optimizes their total costs of contracting.  Note that the parties’ goal is not
simply to minimize contracting costs; parties will incur additional contracting costs so long
as those costs result in improvements in the parties’ incentives to maximize the expected
surplus from the contract.  Thus, the parties’ objective is to “maximize the incentive bang
for the contracting-cost buck.” Id. at 823; see also id. at 840–41 (illustrating concept with
hypothetical example).
16 For a penetrating analysis of the role that rules and standards play in differentiating
textualist and intentionalist statutory interpretation, see Caleb Nelson, What is
Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 398–416 (2005).
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use these cases to explain why sophisticated commercial parties, such
as the parties to these contracts, might prefer their future contracts to
be adjudicated under a regime that applied formal doctrine exclu-
sively, unless the parties indicate otherwise at the time they form their
contract.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a concise over-
view of the origins and evolution of equitable doctrines in American
contract law and claims that the root cause of the problem we identify
is the historical English practice of subordinating law to equity.  This
Part shows how deeply ingrained the equitable mindset is in the his-
tory and current practice of adjudication in American contract law.
Part II turns to contract design theory, focusing particularly on the
strategies that inform the choice between legal and relational means
of enforcement.  Formal contract doctrines that govern the interpreta-
tion of agreements enable parties to partition their agreement into
legally enforceable and legally unenforceable components.  The
faithful application of formal contract doctrine thus permits parties to
choose the optimal mix of legal and relational commitments, while ex
post equitable intervention impairs this choice.  Part III examines the
factors informing the choice between precise and vague contract terms
as a means of effecting contractual ends.  Here the theory of contract
design explains why parties might reasonably choose ex ante to for-
swear doctrines of mistake and excuse even where strict enforcement
of formal contract terms may subject them to the risk of severe hard-
ship.  Finally, Part IV uses the law of conditions to illustrate the ten-
sion inherent in the current two-stage adjudicative regime.  We show
the deep rift within the common law between the formal contract doc-
trines requiring strict enforcement of formal terms and equitable doc-
trines permitting abrogation of those terms when strict enforcement
appears to frustrate the parties’ contractual ends.  The law of condi-
tions shows how the logic of equity invites courts to distort formal
doctrine and to interpret express conditions in ways that better align
with the parties’ contractual ends.
We conclude that the challenges of contract design argue for per-
mitting sophisticated parties the freedom to use combinations of legal
and relational norms, as well as contractual rules and standards, to
optimize their contract in light of uncertainty about the future and the
difficulties of proof.  Since design choices are best made by the parties
ex ante, both theory and the available empirical evidence suggest that
commercial parties would prefer a regime in which equitable override
of formal contract doctrine is invoked only if specifically requested at
the time the parties form their agreement.
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I
LAW AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW
The current regime of American contract adjudication applies
two different sets of doctrines to resolve a contract dispute.  The first
set consists largely of those doctrines that originated in the first seven
centuries of adjudication in King’s Bench and Common Pleas, the
English courts that produced the corpus of the English common law
from the twelfth century until their abolition in the nineteenth cen-
tury.17  These doctrines tend to consist of rules that are administered
strictly, without exceptions for cases in which the application of a rule
appears to defeat its purpose.18  They also tend to be cast in objective
terms that minimize the need for subjective judgment to apply them.19
As noted above, we refer to contemporary contract doctrines that
share these characteristics—and in many cases share their content—as
formal contract law. We refer to the interpretive stance typical of the
English judges who applied common law doctrines from medieval
times through the nineteenth century as formalistic. The formal terms
of a contract are those terms that a formalistic judge applying formal
contract law would identify and enforce in the course of adjudicating a
dispute requiring interpretation and enforcement of the contract.
The second set of doctrines consists largely of equitable principles
that originated in the English Court of Chancery, which began to
exercise overlapping jurisdiction with the common law courts by the
end of the fourteenth century.20  These doctrines originally consisted
of broad principles administered loosely and were designed to provide
alternatives and exceptions to the common law.  They also tended to
17 J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 12, 114 (4th ed.
2002).  The third and oldest common law court was the Exchequer of Pleas. Id. at 47.
Because this court exercised a “relatively minor civil jurisdiction” during the fourteenth,
fifteenth, and early sixteenth centuries, it is not essential to understanding the evolution of
the divide between law and equity. Id. at 48.
18 See infra notes 29–39 and accompanying text (describing approach of King’s Bench
and Common Pleas); see also 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§§ 9.1, 9.5 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing exceptions to general rule that contractual duties are
absolute).
19 See, e.g., DAVID J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLI-
GATIONS 28 (1999) (describing medieval action of debt according to which “a document
under seal granting money from one person to another would be strictly enforced”).
20 The Chancery had two kinds of jurisdiction:  The first, denominated its “Latin side”
because its forms and actions were written in Latin, was to make purely administrative
rulings; the second, denominated its “English side” because its bills and pleadings were in
English, was to adjudicate the bills of complaint that fell within the original jurisdiction of
the King’s council. BAKER, supra note 17, at 100–01.  “It seems probable that the English
jurisdiction was established in its distinct form during the reign of Richard II . . . .  It was
perhaps firmly settled while John of Waltham was master of the rolls (1381–86).” Id. at
103.
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be cast in subjective terms and therefore often required judges to
exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis.  We refer to contemporary
contract doctrines that share these characteristics, and in many cases
also share the content of the Chancery courts’ equitable principles, as
equitable contract law.  We will use the term equitable to refer to the
interpretive stance typical of the English chancellor that applied these
equitable principles from medieval times until the nineteenth century
when law and equity were formally fused and the Chancery courts
abolished.21
In this Part, we describe the characteristics that distinguish not
only the content of formal and equitable contract doctrine but, more
importantly, the dramatically opposed interpretive stances that each
kind of doctrine invites judges to adopt.  Although some of the equi-
table doctrines incorporated into American contract law are applied
routinely by courts adjudicating contract disputes, others are perhaps
most notable for how rarely they are successfully invoked.  For
example, while plaintiffs can in some circumstances enforce oral
agreements by asserting the part-performance exception to the
Statute of Frauds,22 the doctrines of mistake and excuse are rarely
successful defenses to breach of contract claims.23  Despite their infre-
quency, however, these latter doctrines cast a significant shadow of
uncertainty across all contracts.24  By extension, we will argue that
equitable reasoning undermines efficient design not only when courts
apply equitable doctrines directly, but also when courts use equitable
reasoning to guide their application of formal doctrine to the facts of
21 See id. at 114 (discussing abolition of Chancery courts and fusion of law and equity).
22 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, § 6.9.
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, introductory note at 309–10 (1981)
(“Contract liability is strict liability.  It is an accepted maxim that pacta sunt servanda,
contracts are to be kept.  The obligor is therefore liable in damages for breach of contract
even if he is without fault and even if circumstances have made the contract more burden-
some or less desirable than he had anticipated. . . . An extraordinary circumstance may
make performance so vitally different from what was reasonably to be expected as to alter
the essential nature of that performance.  In such a case the court must determine whether
justice requires a departure from the general rule that the obligor bear the risk that the
contract may become more burdensome or less desirable.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS ch. 6, introductory note at 379 (“The law of contracts supports the finality of
transactions lest justifiable expectations be disappointed.  This Chapter deals with excep-
tional situations in which the law departs from this policy favoring finality and allows either
avoidance or reformation on the ground of mistake.”); see also 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note
18, § 9.1.
24 Such uncertainty may be increased by the fact that “[i]n recent years, courts have
shown increasing liberality in discharging obligors on the basis of [certain] extraordinary
circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, introductory note at
309–10 (1981).  For further discussion, see infra Part III and the court’s analysis in
Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc. (ALCOA), 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa.
1980).
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contract disputes.25  The most profound effect of equity on American
contract law, therefore, is its gravitational influence on the judicial
application of formal doctrine in contract disputes.26
The presence of equitable doctrines in American contract law is
widely recognized, but the extent of equity’s influence has not been
fully appreciated.  Our objective in this Part, therefore, is to explain
the depth and breadth of the influence of equity in American contract
law by providing a concise overview of equity’s roots in English legal
history and its incorporation into the doctrines and reasoning of
American contract adjudication.  This overview explains when, how,
and why the logic of equity took hold in the history of contract adjudi-
cation and argues that, despite its eventual merger with formal doc-
trine, equity remains today a significant force deeply antithetical to
the logic of formal doctrine.
A. The Historical Origins of Law and Equity
1. The Creation of Courts of Law and Equity
From their inception, the King’s Bench and Common Pleas courts
entertained actions only by plaintiffs who purchased an original royal
writ, which specified the type of claim that the plaintiff was authorized
to bring and the kind of relief to which the plaintiff would be entitled
should he prevail.27  Because the right to bring an action at the
common law courts derived from the writs issued by the King’s
Chancery, the content of judicially cognizable rights were defined by
the forms of action authorized in the writs.28  If parties had complaints
that did not fit within the confines of existing forms of action, they
could petition the Chancery to issue a new form.29  When the
Chancery’s power to issue new writs was curtailed in the thirteenth
century,30 parties began to petition the King himself, since he retained
25 For example, in Part II.A.2, we argue that the court in Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc.
v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1966), misapplied the parol evidence and integra-
tion doctrines because it implicitly embraced equitable reasoning that equates the parties’
contractual intent with their intended contractual ends instead of means.
26 As we explain in Part IV, the gravitational influence of equity on law reaches its
zenith in the law of conditions, which explicitly directs courts to disregard formal doctrine
in order to avoid the imposition of a forfeiture on one party, even if a neutral application
of formal doctrine would otherwise produce a different result.
27 BAKER, supra note 17, at 53–54.
28 Id. at 54–55.
29 Id. at 55 (“A plantiff . . . had either to find a known formula to fit his case, or apply
for a new one to be invented.”).
30 See id. at 100 (“A late thirteenth-century writer describes [chancellors] as hearing
petitions and complaints, which they determined by issuing writs; though by that time the
discretion to invent new remedies was severely curtailed.”).  As explained, “[i]n the thir-
teenth century one possible response to a petition had been to allow a new form of original
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authority to hear cases in which he believed the common law was
“deficient.”31  The King therefore heard cases alleging that the
common law courts had failed to do justice because they had either
refused to entertain a just claim or had resolved a claim unjustly.  In
exceptional cases, the King took action by granting a “remedy as of
grace.”32
As these “exceptional” private suits became more common, they
were referred to the King’s council.33  The King’s council originally
received bills alleging that parties or officials were “frustrating the
common law.”34  The King’s council either resolved such bills itself or
passed them on to Parliament or to the chancellor for resolution.35
Litigants began to anticipate that their bills would be sent to the chan-
cellor and thus eventually addressed their bills directly to him.36
Under the authority of the council, the chancellor then took responsi-
bility for assigning them to appropriate courts for resolution.37  Thus,
although the Chancery did not originally have the authority to adjudi-
cate claims itself,38 its power to issue the original writs and to receive
bills, coupled with the likelihood that the King’s council would ulti-
mately refer extraordinary suits to the chancellor, led parties to peti-
tion the chancellor himself to provide relief where the common law
courts did not.39  Eventually, the chancellor began “to issue process
and grant decrees in Chancery instead of sending the petition else-
writ, and when that power was curtailed the bill might be referred to parliament for a
legislative solution . . . .” Id. at 102.
31 Id. at 98.  As one historian has explained, the King “retained an overriding residuary
power to administer justice outside the regular system; but the important limitation
imposed on that power by the due-process legislation was that it could be invoked only
where the common law was deficient, and never in matters of life, limb or property.” Id.
32 Id. (“By the end of the thirteenth century numerous petitions (or ‘bills’) were being
presented to the king, asking for his grace to be shown in respect of some complaint.”).
33 Id. (“Already in the fourteenth century the petitioning of the king by bill, seeking a
remedy as of grace, was so common that such business had to be referred to special ses-
sions of the council or parliament . . . .”).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 101.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 99, 101.
39 Id.; see also id. at 101–02 (“The Chancery may have been thought an appropriate
place to furnish new remedies because of its traditional supervision of the issue of original
writs.  A plaintiff applying for an original writ was in a sense making a petition in
Chancery.”).  Before the end of the thirteenth century, the Chancery always had the power
to create a new writ that would provide a form of action suitable to a plaintiff’s complaint.
But when the plaintiff’s claim was based on idiosyncratic facts rendering existing forms
inadequate, rather than a common complaint for which no form of action existed, the
Chancery sought an ad hoc solution rather than the creation of a new form of action. Id. at
102.
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where.”40  By the end of the fourteenth century, the Court of
Chancery had separated from the council and exercised independent,
“extraordinary” jurisdiction to hear cases when “the ordinary course
of law failed to provide justice.”41  By the end of the fifteenth century,
“it became a common saying that no deserving plaintiff would be sent
out of the Chancery without a remedy.”42
2. The Contrasting Approaches of Law and Equity
The Chancery’s willingness to provide an independent and alter-
native forum for justice stemmed from its perception that the adminis-
tration of justice in the common law courts was hamstrung both by the
procedural constraints imposed by the forms of action and rules of
evidence and by the strict, rule-bound inclination of common law
judges to apply the common law rigorously without sympathy for the
poor, oppressed, weak, foolish, or careless.43  In short, King’s Bench
and Common Pleas courts defined justice as the outcome that resulted
from the strict application of (their) due process and substantive
common law doctrines to the cases that came before them.  In this
sense, the common law courts provided justice wholesale:  Common
law judges “preferred to suffer hardship in individual cases than to
make exceptions to clear rules.”44  In contrast, “the chancellor’s eyes
were not covered by the blinkers of due process, and he could go into
all the facts to the extent that the available evidence permitted.”45
Because the chancellor viewed the due process and substantive rules
of the common law as mere means of achieving justice, he set them
aside whenever he believed that they failed to produce a just result.
In short, the Chancery provided justice retail, according to the chan-
cellor’s own view of what justice required in each individual case.
40 Id. at 101.
41 Id. at 117.
42 Id. at 102.
43 See id. at 102–03 (noting that Chancery operated “a court of conscience” that was
“free from the rigid procedures” of common law courts).
44 Id. at 102; see also id. at 325 (“Under the harsh logic of the common law it was
‘better to suffer a mischief to one man than an inconvenience to many, which would sub-
vert the law.’” (quoting Waberly v. Cockerel, (1542) 73 Eng. Rep. 112, 113 (K.B.))).
45 Id. at 104.  In its earliest incarnation, the procedure in Chancery was the antithesis of
the procedure in common law courts:  No writ was necessary, multiple issues could be
joined, evidence was taken free of formal rules, decisions were made by a chancellor rather
than a jury, the court was always open, and trials could take place anywhere (including the
chancellor’s home). Id. at 103.
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Glaston v. Abbot of Crowland46 provides a classic example of the
hard-edged common law reasoning from which the Chancery pro-
vided relief.  In that case, a promisee sued to enforce a penal obliga-
tion on a bond.47  The promisor had previously paid the debt to the
promisee but failed to destroy the deed.48  The promisee subsequently
stole the deed and brought an action of debt against the promisor to
secure double payment.  Under prevailing common law doctrine, a
valid deed provided conclusive proof of the debt,49 so a promisor
could plead the defense of payment only by producing another deed
(an acquittance under seal) proving that he had paid the debt.  The
common law court therefore refused the promisor’s motion to admit
oral evidence to prove that the promisee had in fact stolen the deed
back after the promisor had paid him.50  The common law reasoning
was that it was the promisor’s “own folly not to have had [the deed]
destroyed or to have obtained an acquittance under seal.”51  The
Chancery, however, was “free from the rigid procedures under which
such injustices sheltered.  His court was a court of conscience, in
which defendants could be coerced into doing whatever conscience
required in the full circumstances of the case.”52  Thus, if presented
with a case such as Glaston, the chancellor could ignore the common
law rules of evidence, admit the oral testimony, and order the bond
cancelled in order to serve justice.53
The fundamental opposition of the adjudicative approaches of
the common law courts and the Chancery is illustrated by their con-
trasting views of other cases like Glaston.  In Waberley v. Cockerel,
the court summed up the common law’s rationale for enforcing its
rules without regard to the justice or fairness of the outcome in the
case at bar:
[It is] better to suffer a mischief to one man than an inconvenience
to many, which would subvert a law:  for if matter in writing may be
so easily defeated, and avoided by such surmise and naked breath, a
46 Glaston v. Abbot of Crowland (1330), reprinted in SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY:  PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 252 (J.H. Baker & S.F.C. Milsom eds., 1986) [herein-
after SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY].
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Fishacre v. Kirkham (1289), reprinted in 112 SELDEN SOCIETY 322 (1996).
50 BAKER, supra note 17, at 324–25 (citing Glaston, reprinted in 98 SELDEN SOCIETY
665 (1982), supra note 46, at 252; Donne v. Cornwall, Y.B. 1 Hen. 7, fol. 14v, Pasch, pl. 2
(1486), reprinted in SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 46, at 255).
51 BAKER, supra note 17, at 325.
52 Id. at 103 (footnote omitted).
53 See id. at 104 (explaining that chancellor “could order bonds and other writings to be
cancelled where they would only serve unjust ends”).
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matter in writing would be of no greater authority than a matter of
fact.54
The Waberley court thus justified the rigidity of the common law rule
on the ground of its prospective effect.  Rephrased in contemporary
economic terms, the court’s rationale is that the writing requirement
for proof of payment lowers the expected costs of enforcing bonds and
thereby decreases the costs of lending and borrowing money.  Injus-
tices will find shelter under such a rule only if borrowers either fail to
destroy the deed upon payment or to secure a written acquittance,
both of which are far less costly than the expected costs of adjudi-
cating oral payment defenses.  When such injustices occur, they reveal
the failure of borrowers either to understand the legal rules governing
their transactions or to take measures to protect their interests in light
of those rules.  Thus, the common law judges treated doctrines as
devices for prospective regulation.  To create long-term prospective
benefits for the entire population, the common law rules had to be
known in advance and the costs of complying with them reasonable.
Thus, the courts could not adjust their holdings according to the
impact of the rules on the parties to an individual case at the time of
adjudication.
In contrast, the Chancery’s sole focus was on just and fair dispute
resolution.  Its concern was with the equities of the case at bar, not the
prospective effects of its ruling.  Indeed, for many years the
Chancery’s decrees had no formal precedential effect,55 which initially
freed the Chancery from any concern that its rulings could undermine
the consistency and predictability of adjudication.  Thus, even though
the Chancery sometimes reversed or avoided outcomes decided by
common law courts,56 it understood these actions to be necessary in
order to vindicate, rather than undermine, the common law.57  While
the common law courts were responsible for creating and adminis-
tering a set of rules to guide individuals in the future, the Chancery’s
role was to stand behind those courts and provide ad hoc remedies for
54 Waberley v. Cockerel, (1542) 73 Eng. Rep. 112, 113 (K.B.).
55 See BAKER, supra note 17, at 104 (“In Chancery each case turned on its own facts,
and the chancellor did not interfere with the general rules observed in courts of law.  The
decrees operated in personam; they were binding on the parties in the cause, but were not
judgments of record binding anyone else.”); see also id. at 202 (“So long as chancellors
were seen as providing ad hoc remedies in individual cases, there was no question of their
jurisdiction bringing about legal change or making law.”).
56 See id. at 202 (“In Chancery the just remedy was provided not by changing the law
but by avoiding its effect in the special circumstances of particular cases.”).
57 Councillors and chancellors viewed themselves as “reinforcing the law by making
sure that justice was done in cases where shortcomings in the regular procedure, or human
failings, were hindering its attainment by due process.  They came not to destroy the law,
but to fulfil it.” Id. at 102.
1040 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1023
perceived injustices that, in its view, slipped through the cracks of the
common law as applied in individual cases.58  By circumventing the
writing requirement in cases such as Glaston, the Chancery viewed
itself not as subverting the common law but rather as preventing the
common law from being subverted by the lender.  The premise of the
Court of Chancery was that the common law courts were often power-
less to prevent litigants from invoking black-letter doctrine for unjust
purposes but the Court of Chancery was not.59  By its own lights, the
Chancery existed to work the common law pure.60
Fundamentally, however, the institutions of the common law and
the Chancery were at cross purposes.  The common law’s prospective
regulatory enterprise viewed the adjudication of cases primarily as a
means of creating and sustaining a system of rules justified by its
aggregate effect over time.  In contrast, the Chancery’s dispute resolu-
tion enterprise viewed the adjudication of cases as an end in itself, in
which the sole objective was to do justice between the parties.  The
result was two competing systems of adjudication, often with incom-
patible procedural and substantive doctrines, yet overlapping in juris-
diction.61  For a brief period, the two systems were directly opposed,
with equity literally undoing the final judgments of common law
cases.62  Moreover, the subjectivity of the Chancery’s practice of
deciding cases according to the chancellor’s conscience led to inconsis-
tent, and therefore unpredictable, decisions within the Chancery.63
As the number and importance of the cases before it grew dramati-
58 See id. at 103 (observing that Chancery was “free from the rigid procedures” of
common law courts and could “coerce[ ]” defendants “into doing whatever conscience
required in the full circumstances of the case”).
59 The common law courts were not wholly insensitive to the illegitimate use of legal
doctrines, however.  For example, the common law of contracts refused to enforce con-
tracts supported by illegal or immoral consideration. IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 211.
60 In Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1179 (2007), Daniel Klerman argues that competition between common law courts
led to simple, pro-plaintiff rules because judges were paid, in part, by court fees, and plain-
tiffs chose the forum in which to bring their claims.  Chancery therefore attracted disgrun-
tled defendants who petitioned it to enjoin or otherwise interfere with common law suits.
Because Chancery faced no real competition, it had no incentive to reduce costs through
simplification of doctrine.  Klerman argues that all the equitable doctrines of American
contract law, other than those granting injunctive relief, resulted from Chancery’s exercise
of original jurisdiction in order to compete against common law courts for business.
61 See Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
329, 334–36 (1993) (noting that common law “dilemma” led to “formal separation of courts
of law and equity” and discussing overlapping jurisdictions of these courts).
62 In 1616, James I issued a decree confirming the chancellor’s jurisdiction to entertain
suits in equity even after judgments in law had been handed down on the same matters.
James I’s decree remained in effect until it was declared illegal in 1670. BAKER, supra note
17, at 108–09.
63 As Baker explains,
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cally and the practice of reporting its reasoning and decisions became
regularized, the Chancery eventually created general principles of
equity to constrain discretion and enhance predictability.  Many equi-
table principles matured into a system of rules as clear as law64 and
with equally binding precedential effect.65  Yet equitable doctrine was
still “more flexible than the common law, because it [took] greater
account of individual circumstances.”66
B. The Legal and Equitable Roots of American Contract Law
The system of equitable principles created by the Chancery left
an indelible impression on the contemporary common law of the
United States.  Historically, the division between the Kings Bench and
Common Pleas courts and the court of Chancery acted as a blood-
brain barrier between the matter of the common law and the anti-
matter of equity.  In the nineteenth century, the Chancery was elimi-
nated and law and equity were merged in both England and the
United States.67  The result was an incoherent combination of legal
and equitable doctrines, officially interwoven into the tangled skein
comprising American common law.  To this day, American common
law is torn between the prospective regulatory bent of historically
legal doctrines and the retrospective, dispute-resolution focus of his-
torically equitable doctrines.  Conflicts among these doctrines were
inevitable.  When England officially considered the question of how
The essence of equity as a corrective to the rigour of law was that it should not
be tied to rules.  If, on the other hand, no consistent principles whatever were
observed, parties in like cases would not be treated alike; and equality was a
requisite of equity.  As John Selden quipped in the mid-seventeenth century, if
the measure of equity was the chancellor’s own conscience, one might as well
make the standard measure of one foot the chancellor’s foot.
Id. at 109.
64 During the seventeenth century, equitable doctrines began to congeal into formal
rules, although their objective was still to provide alternatives and exceptions to the
common law.  “By 1676 a chancellor could repudiate the idea that equity had any depen-
dence on his own inner conscience:  ‘[T]he conscience by which I am to proceed is merely
civilis et politica, and tied to certain measures.’  Thus equity hardened into law.” Id. at 110
(footnote omitted); accord Scott, supra note 61, at 336.
65 Although equity still operated to blunt and sometimes circumvent the common law,
within its own rules “even the Chancery would sooner suffer a hardship than a departure
from known rules.” BAKER, supra note 17, at 110.
66 Id. at 110–11.
67 Ironically, by the nineteenth century, the Chancery had developed a set of proce-
dures more arcane and burdensome than the common law procedures it originally sought
to mitigate.  The resulting administrative delay, combined with corruption born of the
Chancery’s practice of paying clerks on a fee basis rather than a salary, ultimately led to
the Chancery’s demise. See id. at 111–12 (explaining major practical defects that devel-
oped in Chancery).  Soon thereafter law and equity were merged. Id. at 114.
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such conflicts should be resolved, it answered clearly that “equity
should prevail.”68  American courts and commentators followed suit.
The American common law of contracts is thus suffused with his-
torically legal doctrines, providing relatively clear and objective rules,
combined with historically equitable doctrines directing courts to cir-
cumvent or override these rules whenever a judge believes that appli-
cation of the legal doctrine would produce a result that is contrary to
the doctrine’s own purpose or otherwise unjust.  American contract
doctrines originating in the English common law courts include the
doctrines of offer and acceptance,69 consideration (including the ille-
gality and immorality doctrines),70 capacity,71 duress,72 warranties and
conditions,73 impossibility,74 fraud-in-the-execution,75 expectation
damages,76 foreseeability,77 and avoidability,78 as well as the plain
meaning rule79 and the parol evidence rule.80  Along with these histor-
ically legal contract doctrines, American contract law also absorbed
and developed doctrines originally developed in Chancery “to miti-
gate the rigours of the Common law.”81  Such doctrines include fraud-
in-the-inducement and intentional misrepresentation,82 negligent and
68 Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § .25(11) (Eng.), reprinted in CHALONER
W. CHUTE, EQUITY UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACT 209 (1874) (“[I]n all matters . . . in
which there is any conflict or variance between the Rules of Equity and the Rules of the
Common Law with reference to the same matter, the Rules of Equity shall prevail.”).
69 IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 222.
70 Id. at 203–04.
71 Id. at 208–09.
72 Id. at 71–72.
73 Id. at 223–25.
74 Id. at 228; see also Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 314 (K.B.) (holding
that “a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing
of the person or thing shall excuse the performance”).
75 The English common law precursor to the American fraud-in-the-execution doctrine
prohibited enforcement of agreements procured by one party misleading the other as to
the contents of a writing under seal. See IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 72.
76 Id. at 87–90.
77 Id. at 229–32.
78 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, § 12.12 (discussing Vertue v. Bird, (1677) 84 Eng.
Rep. 1000, 86 Eng. Rep. 200 (K.B.), to illustrate avoidability doctrine).
79 The common law applied “to documents a rule of construction that the words had to
be given their ordinary meaning.” Id. at 226.
80 BAKER, supra note 17, at 324–25.
81 IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 203.  In general, equity evolved contract doctrines
designed to provide far broader protection against perceived fraud than the common law
provided.  In particular, the core equitable contract doctrines provided relief where an
agreement was not fully voluntary or informed. Id. at 208.
82 This doctrine first required that a defrauded party bring a deceit action in trespass,
then allowed the action to be brought as trespass on the case, and finally permitted it to be
brought in assumpsit. See BAKER, supra note 17, at 329–39.  As an action outside of con-
tract, it required the defrauded party to allege that his contractual partner intentionally
breached a confidence or intentionally misrepresented present facts in order to induce the
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innocent misrepresentation,83 fraudulent nondisclosure,84 unilateral
and mutual mistake,85 specific performance and other injunctive
relief,86 expanded versions of the common law doctrines of capacity
and duress,87 and illegal and immoral consideration.88  American con-
tract law also adopted equitable doctrines specifically designed to
vitiate clear common law rules:  the penalty doctrine,89 the forfeiture
defrauded party to enter into the agreement (the equivalent of the modern defense of
fraud-in-the-inducement).  By the time the action could be brought in assumpsit, however,
its intentional component had been discarded, thus laying the foundation for the contem-
porary doctrine of warranty liability. See id. at 331–33, 337.
83 The equitable defenses of negligent or innocent misrepresentation were the precur-
sors to the contemporary doctrines of fraudulent and material misrepresentation. See
IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 208; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162,
164 (1981).  Strictly speaking, neither contemporary contract nor tort imposes liability or
provides relief for negligent misrepresentation, save in rare cases in which promissory
estoppel is invoked to serve that purpose.  Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores
and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 92 (2007).  But the contem-
porary doctrines of fraudulent and material misrepresentation in the Restatement conceiv-
ably could be construed to void contracts induced by negligent misrepresentation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(1)(b), (c) (1981).  Originally, the equitable
anti-fraud doctrines operated to bar relief for promisees but did not affect the promisor’s
right to sue at law. See IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 209.
84 The equity defense of wrongful silence was the precursor to the contemporary non-
disclosure doctrine.  For examples of cases discussing the equity defense of wrongful
silence, see Broderick v. Broderick, (1713) 24 Eng. Rep. 369 (Ch.), and Chesterfield v.
Janssen, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.). See IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 208 (“Central to
the Chancery’s intervention was the power to relieve against fraud . . . .  The most obvious
case of this was where one person deliberately made a false statement in order to lure
another into a bargain, but it could extend much further than this:  a representation by
conduct might equally constitute fraud, as might a representation by silence.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 161, 164 (1981).
85 IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 210.
86 Id. at 206, 213; see also BAKER, supra note 17, at 320 (“The scope of specific per-
formance was unclear, and plaintiffs seeking such a remedy were drawn into the
Chancery.”).
87 The common law capacity doctrine was confined to prohibiting enforcement of
agreements made by women and infants.  Equity provided a more expansive capacity
defense based on impaired mental capacity, including drunkenness in certain circum-
stances.  The common law duress doctrine was limited to voiding agreements procured by
serious violence or imprisonment.  Equity expanded duress to include undue influence.
IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 209.
88 See id. at 210–11 (explaining that Chancery and common law courts were concerned
with one party “taking unfair advantage” of another and “were quick to sniff out any whiff
of illegality”).  Although both the common law and equity refused to enforce illegal con-
tracts, equity went further to refuse enforcement of contracts it deemed to be against
public policy. See id. at 211–12.
89 The penalty doctrine voids any contract clause providing for liquidated damages in
excess of the parties’ actual or expected compensatory damages.  “In the sixteenth century
the Chancery began to mitigate this by issuing injunctions against the enforcement of pen-
alties in an initially limited range of situations . . . .” IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 150.
By the seventeenth century liability in contract was seen as absolute, in the
sense that, once the parties had reached an agreement, they would in principle
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doctrine,90 the equitable exceptions to the parol evidence rule,91 and
the part-performance exception to the Statute of Frauds.92
The English Chancery is therefore the original source of the two-
tiered system of American contract doctrine.  The English common
law controlled the disposition of a case before the common law courts,
unless the chancellor exercised his discretion to invoke overriding
principles of equity to reverse or provide an alternative to that dispo-
sition.  Similarly, American contract law typically is controlled only
prima facie by common law doctrines.  Equitable doctrines abound,
inviting courts to avoid the strictures of these rules if doing so would
lead to a more fair, just, or equitable result in any given case.
Although courts typically resist the urge to invoke equitable doctrines
in routine cases, the likelihood of equitable intervention in cases with
unusual circumstances is significant.93  And even in less exceptional
cases, the presence of equitable doctrines throughout the common law
has exerted pressures that subtly affect the interpretive stance of
judges applying the strict common law doctrines of contract law.
Thus, rather than simply choosing the most natural of two plausible
interpretations of contract language, judges will often choose the
be held to it unless the defendant could point to duress, fraud, or some other
vitiating factor.  Consistently with this position, the courts’ remedies would
normally give effect to the agreement . . . .  This principle was subject to the
important qualification that the courts would not enforce penalties.  The ori-
gins of this lie in the Chancery practice of the late fifteenth century . . . .
Id. at 213.  Penalties were also forbidden by the statutes of 1669 and 1705. BAKER, supra
note 17, at 325.  For discussion of the evolution of the contemporary penalty doctrine, see
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensa-
tion in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1440–45 (2004).
90 BAKER, supra note 17, at 202–03.  The forfeiture doctrine sets aside implied and
express conditions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981) (“Excuse of
a Condition to Avoid Forfeiture:  To the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition
would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence of that
condition unless its occurrence was a material part of the agreed exchange.”); see also id.
§ 225 cmt. a (“Where discharge would produce harsh results, this . . . effect may be avoided
by rules of interpretation or of excuse of conditions.” (citation omitted)); id. § 227, cmt.
b–c.  We discuss the inherent tension between formal law and equity embedded in the
forfeiture doctrine in Part IV.B, infra.
91 See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§ 153–157
(W.E. Grigsby ed., 1884) (explaining that courts of equity allow parol evidence to modify
contracts upon clear evidence of mistake).
92 Even before the Statute of Frauds was passed, equity had created the part perform-
ance exception to the common law writing requirement. IBBETSON, supra note 19, at 203
n.4.  The equitable doctrine of part performance continued to apply after the statute took
effect. BAKER, supra note 17, at 350.
93 See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc. (ALCOA), 499 F. Supp. 53
(W.D. Pa. 1980) (finding that unpredictable increase of electricity costs entitled seller to
reformation of long-term contract when seller stood to lose amount in excess of sixty mil-
lion dollars).
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interpretation that produces the most congenial result, even if that
interpretation is the less natural one.94
Indeed, the modern law of excuse, frustration, and impractica-
bility follows the nineteenth-century English rationalization of the
equitable doctrine of mistake.  That doctrine, which explicitly informs
the American mistake doctrine, holds that, as a matter of interpreta-
tion, it is presumed that the parties to an agreement are not mistaken
as to any basic and material assumption about a present fact at the
time of formation.95  The excuse, frustration, and impracticability doc-
trines simply extend this presumption to mistakes about future facts.
These doctrines thus formalize the interpretive stance that requires
judges to interpret express contract language, or imply contract terms,
in whatever manner proves necessary to avoid an adjudicative result
that strikes the court as unfair, unjust, or inequitable in light of facts
known to the parties at the time of adjudication.96  In most cases,
courts treat as unjust and unfair any result that diverges significantly
from the parties’ presumed intended contractual ends.
The combination of law and equity in modern American contract
law is widely viewed as unproblematic.97  This view is colored by the
unexamined premise that courts use these doctrines in a straightfor-
ward manner to vindicate contractual intent.  But once the concept of
intent is itself partitioned into means and ends, the rift between law
and equity becomes apparent.  In the remainder of this Article, we
illustrate how both equitable reasoning and equitable doctrines
continue to exert a significant influence on the resolution of contract
disputes.  Our aim is to show how judicial efforts to vindicate contrac-
tual intent by “doing equity” can perversely undermine that intent
and thereby undermine the ability of sophisticated commercial parties
to design efficient contracts through the use of formal contract
doctrine.
94 See, e.g., Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1966)
(looking to parol evidence rather than written contract for evidence of parties’ intent);
Corthell v. Summit Thread Co., 167 A. 79 (Me. 1933) (holding that although company had
sole discretion to determine amount of payment for inventions per contract terms, com-
pany owed reasonable compensation for inventions).  For further discussion, see infra Part
II.A.2 and infra Part IV.C.1.
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152, 153 (1981).
96 See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the equitable doctrines of mistake, excuse,
and frustration in the specific context of ALCOA.
97 Indeed, some scholars applaud the role of equity in contract adjudication. See, e.g.,
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107
(1984) (rejecting formalism in favor of “responsive” contract law that mirrors individual-
ized and subjective approach of equity).
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II
LEGAL AND RELATIONAL MEANS OF EFFECTING
CONTRACTUAL ENDS
In this Part, we analyze the formal rules of interpretation, in par-
ticular the parol evidence rule and integration doctrines.  We use a
well-known contracts case to illustrate the ways in which courts use
equitable reasoning to effectively set aside the parties’ written con-
tract terms by applying formal doctrines in a nonconventional fashion.
In this class of cases, courts conclude that the parties could not reason-
ably have believed that the formal contract terms to which they
agreed constituted a rational means of pursuing their contractual
ends; judicial intervention is thus necessary to vindicate the parties’
“true” contractual intent.  Contract design theory shows, to the con-
trary, that the parties’ formal contract terms may well have consti-
tuted a rational means of pursuing the parties’ objectives.  By refusing
to enforce the parties’ formal contract terms, courts prevent parties
from implementing those contract designs that require strict adher-
ence to formal contract doctrine.
A. Contractual Interpretation and Intent
1. The Function of Doctrines of Interpretation
The formal doctrines of contract interpretation, such as the parol
evidence and plain meaning rules, are widely understood to provide
parties with the means to express their contractual intent.  The sole
purpose of both doctrines is to give parties some control over the pro-
cess courts will use to interpret their intent.98  The parol evidence rule
enables parties to control the admissibility of certain kinds of evidence
in any future adjudication of disputes over their agreement.  The rule
holds that when parties choose to fully integrate a final written agree-
ment, they forfeit the right in subsequent litigation to prove under-
standings they declined to include in their integrated writing.99  There
are a number of reasons why parties may wish to exclude evidence of
certain understandings reached during the contracting process:  Tenta-
tive agreements may be abandoned, agents may misrepresent their
principal’s commitments, or, importantly for our purposes, the parties
may deliberately choose to exclude a portion of their agreement from
legal enforcement.  They may do this in order to rely on self-enforcing
mechanisms, such as reputation, the prospect of future dealings, and
98 SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 3, at 541.
99 See id. (noting that parol evidence rule allows parties to agree not to introduce
“extrinsic evidence” in court).
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the propensity to reciprocate.100  The common law thus has consist-
ently treated the decision to integrate an agreement entirely as a
matter of party discretion.  Courts have no presumption for or against
a finding that a written agreement is integrated.  Instead, they have
devised various neutral tests for determining whether parties intended
to integrate part or all of their agreement into a final, legally enforce-
able writing.101
Similarly, the plain meaning rule is best understood as a device
for preserving a reservoir of terms with clear meanings that cannot be
contradicted in adjudication by contextual evidence supporting a dif-
ferent meaning.102  The best rationale for the plain meaning rule is
that it makes available a public fund of terms with judicially “proofed”
or “protected” meanings on which contractual parties can rely to
effectively communicate their commitments to each other and to
courts.103  The parol evidence and plain meaning rules therefore can
be viewed as tools parties can use to either restrict or provide the
evidence that courts will use to interpret the portion of the agreement
that the parties intend to make legally enforceable.
This straightforward account of the interpretation doctrines as
tools for parties to express their contractual intent is relatively uncon-
troversial.  No one would be surprised to learn that the central inter-
pretation doctrines of contract law can be understood as devices for
effectuating contractual intent.  But courts often perceive a conflict
between the rules governing contractual interpretation and the prin-
ciple of honoring the expressed intention of the parties.104  Courts
therefore sometimes behave as if they face a dilemma:  either main-
tain fidelity to the language and purpose of the various interpretive
doctrines, even though this leads to an outcome that conflicts with the
parties’ expressed intention, or maintain fidelity to the parties’ inten-
100 See infra text accompanying notes 129–33 (discussing possible motivations of parties
in Hunt Foods).
101 See SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 3, at 542–43 (reviewing how common law and
Uniform Commercial Code identify terms of agreement in contract).
102 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:  An Anal-
ysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261,
273 (1985) (explaining that plain meaning rule prohibits external evidence from being used
to interpret terms of contract if terms appear unambiguous in document); Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 6, at 584–90.
103 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 102, at 316–17. (“[S]killful use of the [plain-meaning]
presumption by courts will, over time, increase the supply of officially recognized invoca-
tions and other express conventions.”).
104 See infra text accompanying notes 109–21 (discussing one court’s analysis of whether
terms “consistent” and “contradict” in Uniform Commercial Code’s parol evidence rule
should be treated as synonymous).
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tion even though this requires an application of the interpretive doc-
trines that conflicts with the doctrines’ language and purpose.
Courts confronted with this apparent dilemma are predisposed to
deploy their equitable powers to avoid the application of formal con-
tract doctrine that appears to achieve an unfair or unjust result.  But
the dilemma is false.  It conflates contractual intent with the parties’
intended contractual ends.  By doing so, courts effectively reduce the
range of available contractual means for best achieving contractual
ends.  To the extent that a more constrained choice of means fore-
closes optimal design strategies, this judicial predisposition also
reduces the expected gains from contracting.  Since sophisticated par-
ties wish to maximize the expected gains from contracting, they would
prefer courts to maintain fidelity to those formal doctrines that facili-
tate optimal contract design without regard to their effect on the par-
ties’ intended contractual ends in any particular contract.  We can best
support this claim—and in particular illustrate the value of retaining
the choice between legal and relational means of enforcement—by
focusing on a paradigmatic case.
2. Hunt Foods v. Doliner:  The Parol Evidence Rule and Relational
Norms
Consider the case of Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner.105
Hunt Foods was interested in acquiring the assets of Eastern Can
Company.106  To that end, it entered into extensive negotiations with
George Doliner and his family, who collectively owned 73% of
Eastern Can’s stock.  The parties reached agreement on the price to
be paid for the stock, but before they could agree on the remaining
issues, including the form of the acquisition, they decided to recess the
negotiations for several weeks.  Fearing that Doliner would use the
break to shop the offer to other bidders, Hunt Foods requested an
option to buy the Doliner stock.  The parties executed a written agree-
ment for the purchase of an option that made no mention of any con-
ditions on the exercise of the option.107
Negotiations resumed before the option’s expiration date, and
the parties could not reach agreement on the remaining issues.  Fol-
lowing this impasse, Hunt Foods exercised the option according to its
written terms.  Doliner refused to tender the stock, and Hunt Foods
moved for summary judgment on its suit for specific performance.
Doliner opposed the motion on the grounds that there was an oral
105 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1966).
106 Id. at 939.
107 Id.
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understanding between the parties that the option, though uncondi-
tional on its face, was only to be used in the event that Doliner solic-
ited an outside offer for the stock.  Hunt Foods contended that there
was no such condition and that, in any event, evidence of such an oral
understanding was barred by the parol evidence rule.  Because the
underlying transaction was a purported contract for the sale of securi-
ties, Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) applied and,
by extension, so did the parol evidence rule as embodied in U.C.C.
§ 2-202.108
a. The Court’s Analysis
The court denied Hunt Foods’s motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that the alleged oral understanding was not barred by the
U.C.C.’s parol evidence rule.109  The court cited to U.C.C. § 2-202,
which provided that terms in a writing intended by both parties as
final “may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or
of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or sup-
plemented . . . by evidence of consistent additional terms . . . .”110
Evidence of such additional terms is admissible unless the court finds
that the writing is fully integrated (perhaps by a merger clause) and
thus is not only final as to the agreed terms but exclusive as well.111
The court’s analysis focused on the question of whether the prof-
fered evidence was of a “consistent additional term.”112  The proffered
condition was “clearly [an] ‘additional’” term because it was not set
out in the writing.113  The remaining question was whether the condi-
108 Id. at 939–40 & n.1 (“While article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code which con-
tains this section does not deal with the sale of securities, this section applies to article 8,
dealing with securities. . . . All parties and Special Term so regarded it.” (applying 1966
version of U.C.C.)).
109 Id. at 940.
110 Id. (emphasis added); see also U.C.C. § 2-202 (amended 2003) (stating essentially
same rule as that articulated in Hunt Foods).
111 Hunt Foods, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
112 Id.  The question of whether the proffered evidence is consistent with the writing
does not arise until a court has first determined that the agreement is at least partially
integrated.  The court in Hunt Foods never expressly found the agreement to be partially
integrated.  Instead, the court claimed that, under then comment 3 to U.C.C. § 2-202, the
parties would not have necessarily included the condition in their writing and the court
appeared to conclude implicitly that the writing was therefore not fully integrated with
respect to the condition. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (amended 2003) (containing
current version of comment relied on in Hunt Foods).  Ideally, the Hunt Foods court would
first have found expressly that the parties intended the written option term as their final
expression of that term before turning to the question of whether the condition contradicts
that term.  If the court did not believe the agreement was partially integrated, then there
would be no need to exclude the evidence of the condition even if it did contradict the
written option term.
113 Hunt Foods, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
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tion “contradicted” a term in the written option and whether the con-
dition was “consistent” with the writing.114  Answering these questions
requires a court to interpret the meaning of the statutory language.  Is
a term “consistent” as that word is used in § 2-202(b) as long as it does
not “contradict” a term in the writing?115  Or is the requirement that
the term be “consistent” an independent and additional requirement
for admissibility?  In other words, are the terms “may not . . . contra-
dict[ ]” and “consistent” synonymous or do they impose two indepen-
dent tests for admissibility?116  The latter interpretation—that an
admissible additional term must both not contradict another term in
the writing and be consistent with the terms in the writing—is sug-
gested by the use of different words (with presumably different mean-
ings) in § 2-202.  This interpretation would suggest that a term is
“inconsistent” where it is not in “reasonable harmony” with a term of
the writing even though it did not directly contradict any of the
written terms.117
The court chose instead to interpret “may not . . . contradict[ ]”
and “consistent” as imposing only a single requirement for admitting
the proffered additional term into evidence.  To justify this conclusion,
the court introduced a novel interpretive principle:  “To be inconsis-
tent the term must contradict or negate a term of the writing.  A term
or condition which has a lesser effect is provable.”118  In other words,
even if the written option was properly interpreted as unconditional,
evidence that the parties agreed that the option could be exercised
only on condition that Doliner shopped Hunt Foods’s offer would not
“contradict” the written option because it merely “lessened” the effect
of the option.  Presumably, the Hunt Foods court would have barred
evidence of a term only if it literally negated the written option (i.e.,
evidence that the parties agreed that Hunt Foods would have no
option to purchase the Doliner stock).
The court never addressed explicitly the question of whether the
option was an exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement and
thus whether evidence of even consistent additional terms would be
barred.  But, at least implicitly, the court concluded that the writing
was only a partial but not a complete integration.  The court cited the
comment to § 2-202, which sets out a test for complete integration:  “If
114 Id.
115 U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (amended 2003).
116 Id.
117 This “two step” interpretation of the U.C.C.’s test for admissibility under § 2-202 was
adopted by the court in Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Associates, 380 A.2d 618, 623
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
118 Hunt Foods, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
October 2009] CONTRACT DESIGN AND CONTRACTUAL INTENT 1051
the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would cer-
tainly have been included in the document . . . then evidence of their
alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact.”119  The court
interpreted this standard as barring oral evidence of a consistent addi-
tional term only if the court finds that it is “impossible” that the par-
ties agreed to that term given that they did not include it in their
writing.120  Finding that it was at least possible that the parties agreed
to the condition, even though they did not include the condition in
their written agreement, the court found the agreement was not fully
integrated and admitted the oral evidence of the condition.121
b. Contractual Ends Trump the Rules of Interpretation
The interpretive gloss that Hunt Foods adds to the U.C.C.’s parol
evidence rule threatens to undermine the purposes of the doctrine.  If
the parties intended the written option to be the final expression of
the option term, and if it is clear that the proper interpretation of the
option as written is that it is unconditional,122 then allowing evidence
119 Id.  The Code now embodies this in comment 3.  U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (amended
2003).
120 Hunt Foods, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
121 Id.  The opinion also provides the barest suggestion that the court might have
believed that the oral statement was admissible as evidence that the written agreement,
even if fully integrated, was subject to an oral condition precedent.  Under the rule of Pym
v. Campbell, (1856) 119 Eng. Rep. 903 (K.B.), courts have allowed oral evidence offered to
prove that a fully integrated agreement never came into existence because it was subject to
an oral condition precedent. Id. at 905.  The Restatement admits such evidence on the
ground that it proves the agreement was not fully integrated. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217 cmt. b (1981). But see 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18,
§ 7.4, at 231 n.8 (arguing Restatement explanation is inferior to account that holds agree-
ment is valid but admits oral statement as evidence that agreement did not take effect).
The Hunt Foods court concluded that “the alleged oral condition precedent cannot be
precluded as a matter of law or as factually impossible.”  270 N.Y.S.2d at 940.  Some com-
mentators have stated that the court’s holding therefore should be interpreted as treating
the alleged oral statement as evidence that the agreement did not take effect because it was
subject to an oral condition that never occurred. See, e.g., 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18,
§ 7.4, at 231 & n.9 (noting that qualification of parol evidence rule has been “read into
UCC 2-202 even though that section contains no specific language on the point.”).  Even
on this view, however, evidence of the oral condition precedent is admissible only if it does
not contradict an express term of the written agreement. See, e.g., Intercontinental
Monetary Corp. v. Performance Guars., Inc., 705 F. Supp. 144, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[T]he
parol evidence rule does not bar proof of every orally established condition precedent, but
only of those which in a real sense contradict the terms of the written agreement.” (quoting
Hicks v. Bush, 225 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1962))); see also 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, § 7.4,
at 232 (stating that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible if it contradicts written term).
122 By making the argument that the alleged oral condition would merely lessen the
effect of the written option, the court implicitly held that the written option standing alone
should properly be interpreted as creating an unconditional option.  Other courts have
held that a written option that fails to state expressly whether it is conditional may be
subject to an interpretive default rule that treats it as unconditional absent evidence that
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that the option was conditional undermines the parties’ agreement
that the written option term is a final expression.  Similarly, the
court’s interpretation of the U.C.C.’s test for integration123 eviscerates
the notion that the terms can be both final and exclusive in the
absence of a carefully drafted merger clause.124  In order to exclude
evidence of an additional term on grounds that the agreement was
fully integrated with respect to that term, the Hunt Foods court
required a finding that it would have been impossible, not merely
implausible, for the parties to have intended that term to be part of
their agreement but failed to put it in their writing.125  Such a loose
interpretive standard makes it significantly more difficult for parties to
protect an agreement from ex post changes to the allocation of con-
tractual benefits and burdens based on alleged additional terms.
Why did the Hunt Foods court embrace this controversial anal-
ysis of the U.C.C.’s parol evidence rule?  The best inference is that the
court believed that the parties’ contractual ends were inconsistent
with the claim that Doliner agreed to grant Hunt Foods an uncondi-
tional option.  In short, the court seemed to believe that a straightfor-
ward application of parol evidence doctrine would frustrate the
parties’ intent:  There was no rational reason why the parties would
have intended to exclude the condition from their legally enforceable
agreement.  After all, Doliner wished to adjourn negotiations without
consummating the agreement.  Granting an unconditional option
would allow Hunt Foods to decide unilaterally to consummate the
agreement.  The court, however, also noted that Doliner asked his
attorney why the written option agreement failed to state the condi-
tion.126  His attorney responded that Hunt Foods “insisted” that the
written option not state any conditions, but that the attorney had
the parties intended it to be conditional. See, e.g., Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 565
(Cal. 1968) (“The fact that there is a written memorandum [creating an option] . . . does
not necessarily preclude parol evidence rebutting a term that the law would otherwise pre-
sume.”).  Such a court would not have reason to treat oral evidence that such a written
option is conditional as inconsistent with the written option term.  Instead, the oral evi-
dence would be admissible as evidence that the parties opted out of the interpretive default
rule. See id.
123 This test was found in comment 3 to § 2-202 prior to the 2003 Amendments to
Article 2.  The pre-Amendment version remains current law in all jurisdictions that have
adopted the U.C.C.  In the 2003 amended version of Article 2, the same test for integration
is found in comment 3.  U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (amended 2003).
124 Courts have long recognized that a writing can be found to be a total integration
even in the absence of a merger clause. See, e.g., Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 648 (N.Y.
1928) (excluding evidence of separate oral agreement and adding to terms of deed that
appeared complete on its face despite absence of merger clause); see also SCOTT & KRAUS,
supra note 3, at 541–43 (discussing tests for total integration in absence of merger clause).
125 Hunt Foods, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
126 Id. at 939.
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“obtained an understanding” that the option was to be used only if
Doliner solicited an outside offer.127  The court never reconciled its
implicit conclusion that Doliner would have been willing to grant
Hunt Foods only a conditional option with the fact that Doliner acqui-
esced in Hunt Foods’s demand that he sign a written agreement that
deliberately omitted an express condition on the option.
The only reasonable conclusion Doliner could have drawn from
Hunt Foods’s refusal to accept an expressly conditional option is that
Hunt Foods was not willing to accept any legally enforceable condi-
tion on the option.  One might suppose that Doliner was willing to
sign the writing without the condition only because he believed that
the oral understanding his attorney obtained would be legally enforce-
able.  But if Doliner in fact believed that both he and Hunt Foods
intended the oral condition to be enforceable, then he would have
been utterly mystified by Hunt Foods’s insistence that the condition
not be included in the written option.  Doliner could not reasonably
have believed both that Hunt Foods was content to receive a legally
conditional option and that Hunt Foods had good reason to insist that
the condition not be stated in the writing.128  The puzzle, then, is to
explain why Doliner might have knowingly agreed to grant Hunt
Foods a legally unconditional option even though such a grant seems
inconsistent with his desire to preserve his own option to refuse Hunt
Foods’s current offer.  The most plausible explanation requires an
understanding of the role that relational norms can play in the effi-
cient design of contracts.
B. A Contract Design Explanation of the
Hunt Foods-Doliner Contract
1. Reconstructing the Parties’ Motivations
Understanding the relationship between legal and relational
enforcement provides a key to resolving the puzzle posed above con-
cerning the Hunt Foods contract:  Why did Doliner agree, on the
advice of counsel, to sign an unconditional option?  One can imagine
two scenarios in which Doliner valued a break in the negotiations.  In
the good faith scenario, he was not yet satisfied with all the elements
of the agreement, anticipated he would be able to work them out in
negotiations, but had a pressing demand that required adjourning
127 Id.
128 If Doliner had concluded that Hunt Foods had agreed to a legally enforceable oral
condition but had insisted on excluding the condition from the writing in order to preserve
the possibility of denying the condition later, then Doliner obviously would not have
acceded to Hunt Foods’s demand.
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negotiations for several weeks.  In the bad faith scenario, Doliner
wanted the adjournment because he planned to shop Hunt Foods’s
bid.  Either way, Hunt Foods would understandably be worried that
Doliner might shop its bid, so it insisted on an option to protect itself
in the event Doliner did so.  But, importantly, Hunt Foods understood
that an option conditional on proving that Doliner shopped its bid
would be of little value in court because it would have great difficulty
carrying its burden of proof.  Doliner could simply terminate negotia-
tions on independent grounds and then consummate the deal with
another bidder to whom he had secretly shopped Hunt Foods’s bid
during the adjournment.  Even if Hunt Foods’s officers believed that
they could observe Doliner’s bad faith (e.g., by finding out through
sources if he shopped the bid), they could not readily verify his bid-
shopping to a court.
In short, the costs of verification would likely have precluded the
choice of including an explicit bid-shopping condition in Hunt Foods’s
written option.  But the parties had an alternative:  Hunt Foods’s com-
mitment not to exercise the option unless Doliner solicited another
bid was credible because it was subject to powerful informal sanctions.
In many instances, an agreement between two such commercial par-
ties will be self-enforcing because both parties want to earn and pre-
serve a good reputation in order to gain esteem and future business
dealings.129  Social esteem and a reputation for keeping one’s word
are powerful motivations whenever other potential trading partners
can easily learn why a party’s deal broke down.130  Even in the
129 See SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 9, at 88–94; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at
557; Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 9, at 2039–42; Scott, Self-Enforcing Agree-
ments, supra note 9, at 1680–82.
130 See Avner Greif, Informal Contract Enforcement:  Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 287, 287 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998) (“[I]nformal contract enforcement institutions . . . are a product of the larger
economic, cultural, social and political processes of which they are an integral part.”); Janet
T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group:  An Institutional
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 350–52 (1981) (finding that “invisible
codes of ethics, embedded in the personalized exchange relations among the members of
the [ethnically homogenous middleman group] function as constraints against breach of
contract” and that “a rational trader will enter into particularistic exchange relations with
traders . . . whom he knows to be trustworthy and reliable in honoring contracts”).  As
Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott have noted:
[R]eputations work best in small trading communities, especially those with
ethnically homogenous members [or other cooperation-inducing structures],
where everything that happens soon becomes common knowledge, and boy-
cotts of bad actors are easy to enforce.  Reputational sanctions also can be
effective in industries that can establish trade associations; the associations
become a form of collective memory regarding the contracting behavior of
their members.
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absence of conditions for establishing reputations, agreements will be
self-enforcing to the extent that the parties anticipate the prospect of
future dealings:  Neither party will breach an early contract if the
gains from that breach are lower than the expected profits from future
contracts that a breach would eliminate.131
To be sure, both of these incentives have natural limits.132  But
these limitations do not justify the conclusion that parties such as
Doliner and Hunt Foods would rely exclusively on the legal enforce-
ment of their understanding.  There is strong empirical support for the
claim that powerful norms of reciprocity enhance and extend the
reach of reputation and repeat dealings as means of self-enforce-
ment.133  In sum, contracting parties frequently can (and do) turn to
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 557.  For a discussion of formalist contract enforce-
ment by a private system of merchant courts established by the National Grain and Feed
Association, resulting in part from a recognition of the role of extralegal, reputational
sanctions, see generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:  Rethinking the
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Merchant Law]. See also Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry:  Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1724 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law] (discussing importance of
reputation-based nonlegal sanctions in cotton industry).
131 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 557 (“Reputation . . . will induce performance
when a single contract partner’s boycott would not.”).
132 Reputations are difficult to establish in large, heterogeneous economies in which
particular contracting parties are anonymous and ongoing relationships inevitably come to
an end.  When parties come to realize that the relationship is soon to terminate (say, when
the promisor contemplates retirement or otherwise withdraws from the trading commu-
nity), the threat that the other party will no longer deal with the promisor is insufficient in
and of itself to induce performance. See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur:  The Self-
Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 447–50 (1996) (dis-
cussing conditions for self-enforcing contracts); Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note
9, at 2039–49 (same).
133 Experimental evidence shows that a preference for reciprocity—the willingness to
reward cooperation and to punish selfishness—can motivate cooperation even in arms-
length interactions between complete strangers.  See generally Ernst Fehr & Klaus M.
Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON. 817, 818
(1999) [hereinafter Fehr & Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness] (“[I]n addition to purely self-
interested people, there are a fraction of people who are also motivated by fairness consid-
erations.”); Ernst Fehr, Simon Ga¨chter & Georg Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a Contract
Enforcement Device:  Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 833 (1997)
(“[R]eciprocal behavior may cause an increase in the set of enforceable contracts and may
thus allow the achievement of nonnegligible efficiency gains.”); David K. Levine, Modeling
Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments, 1 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 593, 594 (1998) (exam-
ining quantitative implications of “the theory” that “fairness plays a role in individual deci-
sion making”); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,
83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1282 (1993) (discussing “a game-theoretic framework for incor-
porating [reciprocity] into a broad range of economic models”).  For a review of literature
discussing how fairness considerations “shape the behavior of people in important eco-
nomic domains,” see Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reci-
procity—Evidence and Economic Applications 3–4 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 403, 2000; Univ. of Zurich, Inst. for Empirical
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relational enforcement based on trust, or the desire to maintain a
good reputation in the relevant community, or on the prospect of
profitable future dealings.  In a context such as the negotiations
between Doliner and Hunt Foods, these norms may provide the best
available means of regulating the contractual relationship and of
enforcing promissory commitments.  Not only would have the reputa-
tion of Hunt Foods been jeopardized if it had behaved opportunisti-
cally in the acquisition negotiations, but, more importantly, counsel
for both sides could have used their reputations to lend support to the
understanding.  Since attorneys in merger and acquisition deals are
drawn from homogeneous communities, their respective commitments
are credible and they can “lend” their reputations to enhance the
credibility of their principals’ commitments.
What role does legal enforcement play in contexts where rela-
tional enforcement is pervasive and robust?  The experimental evi-
dence suggests that relational enforcement, when it is effective, is both
cheaper and better than legal enforcement.134  Relational enforce-
ment is cheaper because a party only needs to expend costs to observe
the other’s behavior, while legal enforcement requires the parties to
expend additional resources (e.g., attorneys’ fees, court costs, etc.) in
verifying that behavior to a court.  Less obvious but perhaps even
more significant is the fact that relational enforcement is better.  It
permits parties to make credible promises regarding observable but
nonverifiable measures of performance, thus achieving contractual
objectives that may not be possible with legal enforcement.135  In
short, there are good reasons why both Doliner and Hunt Foods might
have been motivated to exclude the alleged condition from the legally
enforceable portion of their agreement.
The preceding reconstruction of motivations is consistent with the
facts of Hunt Foods.  One of two scenarios occurred.  Either Hunt
Foods never agreed to a condition and Doliner’s testimony was
untruthful; or, as he testified, the parties agreed informally not to
exercise their option unless Doliner shopped its bid, but Hunt Foods
insisted formally on a legally unrestricted option.  Doliner would
agree to these terms if either he had no intention of shopping Hunt
Foods’s bid and trusted Hunt Foods to abide by its nonlegally enforce-
able agreement, or he planned to shop the bid and then render the
Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 75, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
255223.  For discussion of how reputation and reciprocity serve as “effective means of self
enforcement” of agreements, see Scott & Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agree-
ments, supra note 11, at 565–66.
134 SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 9, at 22–23.
135 Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, supra note 9, at 1667–72.
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option useless by claiming that the option was conditional and
requiring Hunt Foods to prove the condition was met.  Hunt Foods
then exercised the option either because Doliner did, in fact, shop the
bid or because its officers acted in bad faith by taking advantage of the
legally unrestricted option and breaching the informal agreement.
2. The Costs of Conflating Contractual Intent with the Parties’
Contractual Ends
The court in Hunt Foods apparently believed that the parties had
no reason to exclude from legal enforcement an agreed-upon condi-
tion on the exercise of the option.  Assuming the condition was part of
the agreement, a strict application of the Code’s parol evidence rule
would have frustrated the parties’ objective of suspending negotia-
tions while protecting Hunt Foods from the risk of bid-shopping.
Thus, the most plausible explanation for the unconventional interpre-
tation of the parol evidence rule in Hunt Foods is that the court chose
to apply the formal doctrine in a nonstandard fashion in order to vin-
dicate Doliner’s assumption that the oral understanding was part of
the parties’ agreement.  The court appears to have concluded that a
strict enforcement of the formal contract terms would have defeated
the parties’ contractual intent.  But manipulating the doctrine in this
manner has the perverse effect of impairing the contractual means
that parties use to effect their ends.  This is so regardless of whether
the parties in Hunt Foods deliberately chose relational enforcement or
Doliner was simply mistaken in his understanding of the effect of the
agreement.
The costs of the two-tiered system of adjudication that implicitly
authorizes a court to deploy its equitable powers and manipulate
formal contract doctrine are prospective.  Without a fully functioning
parol evidence rule, parties will have difficulty partitioning their
agreement into separate legal and relational components.  Instead, the
entire agreement will be subject to legal enforcement.  The problem
with this outcome is that the empirical evidence suggests that legal
enforcement is often imperialistic:  An effort to superimpose legal
enforcement on a regime of relational enforcement is likely to dis-
place the nonlegal mechanisms.136  For example, experimental evi-
dence shows that reciprocity, operating alone, generates high levels of
cooperative behavior between contracting parties.137  But once the
136 Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, supra note 9, at 1688–92.
137 Fehr & Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, supra note 133, at 817–18; see also Fehr,
Ga¨chter & Kirchsteiger, supra note 133, at 833 (“[R]eciprocal behavior may cause an
increase in the set of enforceable contracts and may thus allow the achievement of nonneg-
ligible efficiency gains.”); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incen-
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entire relationship, including its nonlegal aspects, is subject to legal
enforcement, voluntary reciprocity declines along with the overall
level of cooperation.138  These experimental results suggest that legal
sanctions and relational sanctions may well conflict with one
another.139  In other words, legal enforcement may “crowd out”
behavior based on reciprocity.140
The experimental evidence of crowding out supports the claim
that commercial parties would prefer formal contract doctrines that
permit them to partition their agreements into legally enforceable and
tives (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Working Paper No. 507, 2002), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract_id=294287 (“[R]eciprocity induces agents to cooperate voluntarily with the
principal if the principal treats them kindly.”). See generally Rabin, supra note 133 (incor-
porating individual’s feelings about whether individual is being treated fairly into game
theory); Martin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, 47
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 268 (2003) (developing model to describe reciprocity in context
of sequential games); Fehr & Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, supra note 133, at 818 (ana-
lyzing conflicting evidence and developing model to explain why “[s]ome pieces of evi-
dence suggest that many people are driven by fairness considerations, other pieces indicate
that virtually all people behave as if completely selfish, and still other types of evidence
suggest that cooperation motives are crucial”); David K. Levine, Modeling Altruism and
Spitefulness in Experiments, 1 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 593 (1998) (proposing simpler model
than Rabin’s based on altruism); Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, A Theory of Reciprocity
(Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 457, 2001),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=203115 (presenting formal
theory of reciprocity).
138 Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, supra note 9, at 1688–92.
139 Id.
140 To be sure, the crowding-out phenomenon is complex.  A number of studies have
confirmed the crowding-out hypothesis in single iteration experiments, where the parties
must choose either nonlegal or legal enforcement.  In these studies, the choice of legal
enforcement uniformly suppresses the evidence of reciprocity that is found in the alterna-
tive scenario of no legal enforcement.  See generally Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey & Steffen
Huck, More Order with Less Law:  On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 131, 131, 141 (2001) (“Individuals perform a contract when enforcement is
strong or weak but not with medium enforcement probabilities:  Trustworthiness is
‘crowded in’ with weak and ‘crowded out’ with medium enforcement.”); Fehr, Ga¨chter &
Kirchsteiger, supra note 133; Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory,
15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589, 596–606 (2001) (surveying experimental evidence suggesting
that introduction of monetary penalties and other financial incentives can decrease individ-
uals’ willingness to work together and behave reciprocally); Bruno S. Frey & Matthias
Benz, Motivation Transfer Effect (June 12, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/benz/downloads/MTE.pdf) (finding that economic incen-
tives reduce intrinsic motivation, including desire to cooperate and follow social norms,
even with respect to conduct not subject to incentive mechanism).  But recent experiments
also show that, where there is some probability that the same buyers and sellers will
continue transacting in the next period, legal enforcement that is limited to the verifiable
dimensions of the agreement actually enhances cooperation in those dimensions of the
agreement that are nonverifiable. See Sergio G. Lazzarini, Gary J. Miller & Todd R.
Zenger, Order with Some Law:  Complementarity Versus Substitution of Formal and
Informal Arrangements, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 261, 261 (2004) (“[B]y enforcing contract-
ible exchange dimensions, contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of noncontractible
dimensions.”).
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legally unenforceable components.  The evidence suggests that an
attempt to extend legal enforcement to difficult-to-verify contract
terms—such as an understanding that an option will only be exercised
if the counterparty is bid-shopping—is likely to impair the efficacy of
those means of enforcement that rely on relational norms.  As we
noted in Part I above, formal common law contract doctrine has
resisted this invitation to imply broad standards of fairness or equi-
table adjustment.  Formal contract law uses rules of interpretation that
afford the parties wide discretion to determine the scope of legal
enforcement precisely.  The availability of nonlegal means of
enforcing commitments that courts cannot easily verify supports this
approach.  Therefore, the more general lesson for courts is that the
equitable instinct to judicialize preferences for fairness and reciprocity
may well destroy the effectiveness of these nonlegal mechanisms.141
Regardless of which scenario better conforms to the underlying
facts, therefore, commercial parties intent on maximizing the expected
gains from contracting would prefer that a court faced with the issues
in Hunt Foods would rule inadmissible the evidence of an oral condi-
tion on an option.  A court could reach this result either (a) by faith-
fully applying the “certain inclusion” test to find that such an
agreement was fully integrated, thereby barring evidence of even a
consistent additional term, or (b) if the agreement was only partially
integrated, by ruling the evidence of the condition inadmissible
because it was being offered to prove a term that was inconsistent
with the express condition in the writing.142  A court could even rec-
oncile enforcement of the unrestricted written option with the belief
that the parties’ contractual ends were to grant only a conditional
option.  As long as the parties understood that the condition was to be
enforced informally, then legal enforcement should not be available as
a backstop.  After all, self-enforcing mechanisms occasionally break
down, and, in the event they do, parties who negotiated legally nonen-
forceable mechanisms should accept their failure and not seek the
legal enforcement they eschewed in the original agreement.  Though
the mechanisms may break down, there is strong evidence that com-
mercial parties prefer to retain the option to enforce their commit-
141 It is important to keep in mind that legal disputes only arise when the informal
modes of enforcement have broken down.  Litigated cases, therefore, offer little evidence
of the power of reciprocity, reputation, and other informal mechanisms in enforcing the
agreements between commercial parties that never reach litigation.
142 Alternatively, if the Hunt Foods court were to be interpreted as having treated the
oral statement as evidence of a condition precedent to the agreement’s taking effect, see
supra note 121, the court should have held that the condition was not admissible because it
contradicted the express option in the agreement.
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ments through two sets of rules:  an explicit (and formal) set of rules
for those parts of their relationship that require legal enforcement and
an implicit (and flexible) set of rules for those aspects that respond
best to self-enforcement.143  By correctly identifying the parties’ con-
tractual ends but failing to understand that the parties might reason-
ably have chosen to achieve those ends by using both legal and
nonlegal means, the court in Hunt Foods undermined the ability of
parties in the future to regulate their relationships with a combination
of legal and nonlegal norms.
How representative is the decision in Hunt Foods?  All the avail-
able evidence suggests that courts in the United States are sharply
divided between jurisdictions that retain a “hard” parol evidence juris-
prudence that hews closely to formal contract doctrine and those
courts that have relaxed the formal doctrine in favor of a “soft” parol
evidence rule that invites courts to vindicate contractual ends ex
post.144  Perhaps the clearest examples of this trend are the differing
approaches to contractual interpretation employed by courts in New
York and California.  New York courts continue to adhere to formal
doctrine in cases that fall outside the more liberal purview of the
U.C.C.145  Thus, New York courts continue to follow the traditional
143 See Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Con-
tracts:  A Contract Lawyer’s View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189,
227–28 (1995) (discussing tradeoffs between legal and relational means of enforcement);
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 130, at 1788–89 (same); David Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 391–426 (1990) (same);
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:  A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55, 60–65 (1963) (discussing pervasive use of relational enforcement in sample
of business contracts); Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions,
87 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2249–52 (1999) (discussing tradeoffs between legal and relational means
of enforcement); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunc-
tional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2458 (2000) (same).
144 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534 (1998) (distinguishing
two polar positions:  “hard-PER,” where “the court generally excludes extrinsic evidence
and relies entirely on the writing,” and “soft-PER,” where “the court gives weight both to
the writing and to the extrinsic evidence”). See generally Robert A. Hillman, The “New
Conservatism” in Contract Law and the Process of Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879,
881–88 (1999) (identifying shift in contract law in favor of written contracts over “alleged
oral, less formal representations or agreements” and predicting shift in judicial interpreta-
tion away from “new conservative” outlook toward more liberal approach to contract
interpretation); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1131, 1132–35 (1995) (identifying difference between hard and soft interpretive
regimes and arguing that hard regimes tend to benefit already powerful and wealthy class).
For a discussion of approaches to choosing a hard or soft interpretive regime, see SCOTT &
KRAUS, supra note 3, at 596–97.
145 See, e.g., Morgan Stanley High Yield Sec., Inc. v. Seven Circle Gaming Corp., 269 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying defendant’s claim of unsatisfied oral condition
precedent and enforcing written contract when contract said “this Agreement is [the
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“four corners of the contract” presumption by which the finality of a
writing is determined in the first instance from an examination of the
writing itself.146  In California, by contrast, the courts have for many
years invited collateral attacks on contractual writings if necessary to
better determine the “true intent of the parties.”147
Our claim that sophisticated parties prefer a “hard” parol
evidence jurisprudence is supported by recent work by Theodore
Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller studying choice of law and choice of
signing party’s] legal, valid and binding obligation enforceable against it in accordance with
its terms” (alteration in original)); Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 571 N.E.2d 641,
642, 644 (N.Y. 1991) (excluding parol evidence where writing appeared to embody parties’
final agreement unambiguously); Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 647–48 (N.Y. 1928)
(upholding four-corners presumption and excluding evidence of collateral agreement to
land-sale contract).
146 Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargaining on the Red-Eye:  New Light on Contract Theory 40
(N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 131, 2008), available at http://lsr
.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/131; see, e.g., Morgan Stanley, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 214 (“Under
New York law a contract which appears complete on its face is an integrated agreement as
a matter of law.”).  In addition, merger clauses are given virtually conclusive effect in New
York. See Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a
merger clause provision indicates that the subject agreement is completely integrated, and
parol evidence is precluded from altering or interpreting the agreement.”); Jarecki v.
Louie, 745 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (N.Y. 2001) (“The purpose of a merger clause is to require
the full application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic
evidence . . . .  The merger clause accomplishes this purpose by evincing the parties’ intent
that the agreement ‘is to be considered a completely integrated writing.’”); Norman
Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (App. Div. 1991) (“Parol evidence is
not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract containing a merger clause.”).
147 Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (admitting parol evidence to vary
terms of deed on ground that “[e]vidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded
only when the fact finder is likely to be misled”); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968) (“[R]ational interpretation requires
at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention
of the parties.”); see also Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There Is a Parol
Evidence Rule in California—The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(examining California cases raising issue of admissibility of extrinsic evidence and con-
cluding that parol evidence jurisprudence represents one of most confused and incoherent
areas of law in California); Miller, supra note 146, at 41–42 (“If . . . the extrinsic evidence
reveals ambiguity, then the court may consider all such extrinsic evidence as may be rele-
vant to interpreting the contract.”).  Martin-Davidson found the following after examining
California cases:
The cases in the study did not confirm the accusation that California has aban-
doned the parol evidence rule.  On the other hand, neither did they suggest
that the rule is alive and well.  Instead, they supported a different accusation:
that the parol evidence rule persists in California like a neomort maintained on
permanent life-support as a ready source of transplant organs.  The many stan-
dard but incompatible formulations of the parol evidence rule are ready as
needed in this on-going and inconclusive battle.  One faction is fighting in
defense of the written word while its many enemies insist that a written agree-
ment is not “all they wrote.”
Martin-Davidson, supra, at 9.
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forum clauses in a data set of 2865 contracts.148  Their study shows
that parties chose New York law in 46% of the contracts and New
York as the forum state in 41% of the contracts.149  California, on the
other hand, was chosen for its contract law in less than 8% of the
contracts even though its commercial activity, as measured by the
place of business of the contracting parties, was second only to New
York.150  The Eisenberg and Miller study illustrates the strong prefer-
ences of commercial parties for the formal contract law of New York
in lieu of the frequent exercise of equitable overrides by courts in
California.
III
RULES AND STANDARDS AS MEANS TO EFFECT
CONTRACTUAL ENDS
In the preceding Part, we examined the tradeoffs between legal
and nonlegal enforcement that parties confront when designing their
contracts.  In this Part, we focus on the second design challenge that
arises once parties have determined to enter into a legally enforceable
agreement:  How should the parties choose between precise, bright-
line contract terms (or rules) and broad, vaguely defined terms (or
standards)?  We begin our analysis of the tradeoffs in the design of
legally enforceable contracts by focusing on the contract dispute in a
well-known case, Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc.
(ALCOA).151 ALCOA is a paradigmatic illustration of cases in which
courts conclude that the parties would have intended judicial interven-
tion under the post-formation circumstances that have materialized.
While the reformation remedy adopted by the court in ALCOA has
not been followed elsewhere (and, as a consequence, claims of excuse
are only rarely granted by courts),152 the case nevertheless provides a
vivid illustration of how equitable reasoning can be used to vitiate
formal doctrine.
148 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York:  An Empirical
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Con-
tracts 4–5 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 124, 2008), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/124.
149 Id. at 19, 34.  Delaware was a distant second to New York, with about 15% of the
parties choosing its law.  No other state accounted for even 10% of the choices of law. Id.
at 19.
150 Id. at 19 tbl.2, 23 tbl.5.
151 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
152 See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts:  An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271–72 (1992) (describing pas-
sivity of courts in contract-excuse cases).  For a case rejecting ALCOA’s reasoning, see
Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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It is tempting to object that ALCOA’s application of the mistake
doctrine is the exception that proves the rule:  Because few courts
have followed ALCOA’s reasoning, the vast majority of long-term
contracts between sophisticated commercial parties are unlikely to be
set aside or reformed by application of the mistake doctrine.153
Despite their infrequency, we believe that cases like ALCOA cast a
significant shadow of uncertainty across all contracts.  More impor-
tantly, however, we believe that the impact of equitable doctrines such
as the mistake doctrine is significant because of the far more
numerous cases in which equitable reasoning plays a significant role in
shaping the outcome.  Thus, we use ALCOA to illustrate the kind of
reasoning that underpins all equitable doctrines.  That reasoning,
explicit in ALCOA, invites courts to vindicate the parties’ intended
contractual ends, either directly by using equitable doctrines to over-
ride formal doctrine or indirectly by applying formal doctrine in a
nonstandard fashion.  When a court concludes that the ex post circum-
stances are historically exceptional, it reasons that the parties would
have wanted the court to intervene to realign their contract terms with
their contractual ends.  Contract design theory shows, however, that
this inference is not justified.
A. Contractual Intent and the Law of Mistake and Excuse
1. The ALCOA-Essex Contract
ALCOA and Essex entered into a long-term tolling contract
whereby ALCOA undertook to convert alumina supplied by Essex
into aluminum.154  The agreement was to last for sixteen years, with
an option by Essex to renew for five additional years, and specified a
fixed quantity of seventy-five million pounds of aluminum to be deliv-
ered to Essex per year.  Along with its obligation to take seventy-five
million pounds per year, Essex had the concomitant obligation to
deliver sufficient alumina for ALCOA to convert into aluminum,
which Essex could then dispose of as it pleased.
The contract contained a detailed price indexing provision.  The
initial contract price was 15 cents per pound, to be adjusted according
to a complex formula:  5 cents of the price was designated as a
“demand charge.”  This reflected ALCOA’s capital costs for the
smelting capacity at its Warrick, Indiana plant.  In addition, Essex
agreed to pay a 10 cent production charge, of which 4 cents were
153 See infra text accompanying notes 160–71 for a discussion of the doctrine of mistake
and the reasoning of the court in ALCOA.
154 The contract between ALCOA and Essex is analyzed in detail in VICTOR
GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW:  AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 348–69 (2006).
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fixed.  Of the remaining variable costs, 3 cents corresponded to the
labor cost and 3 cents reflected the nonlabor production cost.  The
former was indexed by a labor index; the latter was indexed by the
Wholesale Price Index, Industrial Commodities (WPI-IC).  At Essex’s
insistence, the parties agreed that the contract price would be capped
at 65% of the price of a standard grade of aluminum ingot as pub-
lished in American Metal Market, a trade publication.  Although
ALCOA did not choose to protect itself similarly against the possi-
bility that the WPI-IC would fail to track costs accurately, the contract
did provide for the risk that the indexes would no longer be avail-
able.155  In short, at Essex’s insistence, the index related to ALCOA’s
costs included a circuit breaker if the index rose too fast relative to the
underlying market price, but ALCOA did not require a corresponding
“booster” if the index moved too slowly.  Thus, the index had a ceiling
but not a floor.
The contractual purposes for the index were clear from
ALCOA’s perspective:  The 5 cent demand charge represented 4 cents
for financial costs (depreciation, interest, and so on) and 1 cent “guar-
anteed profit.”  The fixed portion of the production charge included 3
cents profit and 1 cent to cover general administrative and selling
expenses.  Of the variable costs, 3 cents represented labor costs and 3
cents reflected material costs, about 75% of which was for power.  As
Victor Goldberg suggests, the contract was thus designed to “repli-
cate” a situation wherein “Essex invested in a smelter with a capital
cost of 40 cents per pound with a 10% (4 cent) return.  The demand
charge would be paid by Essex regardless of whether it took any alu-
minum, so in that sense it was taking the risk of ownership.”156
2. The Litigation in ALCOA
Unfortunately for ALCOA, the index moved too slowly relative
to the actual market, owing in part to the underrepresentation of
energy costs in the basket of inputs that comprise the WPI-IC relative
to the costs of converting alumina into aluminum.  Three things hap-
pened that caused the contract price to be out of line with both
ALCOA’s costs and the price of aluminum.  The OPEC oil embargo
155 Clause 28 of the ALCOA-Essex contract provides:
In the event that any index referred to in paragraph 8 and 9 hereof is discon-
tinued, no longer published in the sources indicated or become [sic] unavail-
able, the parties shall agree on a comparable substitute index and if they are
unable to agree [on] the selection of a substitute index, the selection of a com-
parable substitute index shall be submitted to arbitration . . . .
Id. at 354.
156 Id. at 353.
October 2009] CONTRACT DESIGN AND CONTRACTUAL INTENT 1065
caused coal prices to rise far more rapidly than the WPI-IC, so the
nonlabor variable production cost component failed to track the
actual costs:  ALCOA’s nonlabor production costs rose from 5.8 cents
in 1973 to 22.7 cents in 1978, while the WPI-IC rose by less than two-
fold of the original.157  In addition, there were extraordinary rates of
inflation in the 1970s, such that the nominal price for aluminum rose
significantly.  Finally, there was an increased demand for aluminum
and thus the underlying or “real” price of aluminum rose as well.158
By 1979, the per-pound market price of aluminum ingot was
around 73 cents, while ALCOA’s costs were around 35 cents and the
indexed contract price was 25 cents.  Since Essex’s costs for the alu-
mina and for transportation to the Warrick smelter were about 11
cents, it could capture a profit of 37 cents per pound if it chose to
resell the ingot on the market.  And in fact, ALCOA claimed that
Essex had exploited this favorable structure and had resold almost
23% of the aluminum on the open market.159
ALCOA sought to renegotiate the contract, but Essex refused.
ALCOA then brought suit asking for equitable reformation of the
contract.  The crucial issue for the court was the rapid increase in the
cost of power at the Warrick smelter and the failure of the price index
to track those costs.  The court granted ALCOA relief on the grounds
of mutual mistake, commercial impracticability, and frustration of
purpose.160  Rather than excuse ALCOA, however, the court chose to
reform the contract by rewriting the price term.  The new contract
price would be the lesser of the 65% cap and either the price as
defined in the contract or ALCOA’s costs plus 1 cent, whichever was
greater.161
In its mutual mistake analysis, the court concluded that there was
a mistake as to a fact—the belief that the index would work as the
parties expected.  It also found that this mistake was mutual because
157 Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc. (ALCOA), 499 F. Supp. 53, 59 (W.D. Pa.
1980).
158 The price term also failed to properly index the fixed-demand charge representing
ALCOA’s capital investment in the smelter. GOLDBERG, supra note 154, at 356.
159 ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 59; GOLDBERG, supra note 154, at 355.
160 ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 60–78.  The court based its analysis of the three doctrines
on the relevant provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-615 (amended 2003) (containing current ver-
sion of excuse by failure of presupposed conditions doctrine similar to that relied on in
ALCOA); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151–154 (1981) (mistake); id. § 261
(discharge by supervening impracticability); id. § 265 (discharge by supervening
frustration).
161 Ultimately, the new contract price “would have meant that in 1979 ALCOA would
have received about 11 cents per pound more than it would have absent the modification.”
GOLDBERG, supra note 154, at 357.
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mutuality is a question of understanding, not motivation, and thus
rejected Essex’s argument that the mistake was not mutual because
Essex was not concerned about keeping ALCOA’s costs in check.
The court emphasized the strict test required to establish excuse on
the basis of mutual mistake:  The mistake doctrine applies to a mis-
taken belief about a particular fact only if, as Corbin asserted, a court
decides “the parties made a definite assumption that it existed and
made their agreement in the belief that there was no risk with respect
to it.”162  According to the court, the alleged mutual mistake in
ALCOA was the parties’ belief in “the suitability of the WPI-IC as an
index to accomplish the purposes of the parties.”163  The court found
that “each [party] assumed the Index was adequate to fulfill its pur-
pose.  This mistaken assumption was essentially a present actuarial
error.”164
Because the court found the doctrine of mutual mistake appli-
cable to the case, it would seem to follow that it believed the parties
“made their agreement in the belief that there was no risk”165 that the
price index would fail to reflect ALCOA’s actual costs.  This is pre-
cisely the claim Essex denied.166  The court’s response was to demon-
strate that the parties “plainly sought to limit the risks of their
undertaking.”167  Chief among the pieces of evidence cited to demon-
strate the parties’ efforts to limit risk under their agreement was the
fact that ALCOA hired Dr. Alan Greenspan to advise it on the
drafting of the objective price index.168  As to the question of why
162 ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 60 (emphasis added) (quoting 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 605, at 643 (1960)).
163 Id. at 61.
164 Id. at 63.  The requirement that the mistaken belief must concern a fact that exists at
the time of the agreement serves to distinguish the law of mistake from the law of excuse.
While the mistake doctrine voids agreements based on mistaken assumptions about mat-
ters of fact that exist at the time of formation, it is designed not to apply to cases in which
parties make mistaken predictions about the future, such as erroneous assumptions about
future market conditions or their future financial situations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 152 cmt. b (1981).  The ALCOA court therefore could only use the mistake
doctrine as a ground for reformation by characterizing the parties’ mistake about the
future functioning of the price index as a mistake concerning a fact in existence at the time
of the contract’s formation.
165 ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 60.
166 Id. at 68.  As the court noted, “Essex first asserts that ALCOA expressly or implicitly
assumed the risk that the WPI-IC would not track ALCOA’s non-labor production costs.
Essex asserts that ALCOA drafted the index provision . . . and that ALCOA’s officials
knew of the inherent risk that the index would not reflect cost changes.” Id.
167 Id.
168 Alan Greenspan’s actual role in developing the price term is a matter of some dis-
pute.  In its brief to the Third Circuit, Essex claimed that “[c]ontrary to the trial court’s
finding, George [Alcoa’s key negotiator] testified that Alan Greenspan . . . was not con-
sulted by Alcoa in connection with [the] Contract.” GOLDBERG, supra note 154, at 361
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ALCOA did not include a price floor, whereas Essex included a price
ceiling, the court responded:  “[T]he absence of an express floor limi-
tation can only be understood to imply that the parties deemed the
risk too remote and their meaning too clear to trifle with additional
negotiation and drafting.”169  The court argued that:
The proper question is not simply whether the parties to a contract
were conscious of uncertainty with respect to a vital fact, but
whether they believed that uncertainty was effectively limited
within a designated range so that they would deem outcomes
beyond that range to be highly unlikely. . . . Both consciously under-
took a closely calculated risk rather than a limitless one.170
Thus, the court moved from Corbin’s requirement that the parties
believe there is no risk that they are wrong about their shared factual
belief, to a more liberal requirement that the parties believe it is
highly unlikely that their shared factual belief is wrong.
But when the parties are conscious of a particular risk and yet
form a belief that the risk has been reduced or eliminated, it is no
longer plausible to argue that it did not occur to them that their belief
might be wrong.  In such a case, it is far more difficult to conclude that
the parties did not intend to allocate this risk.  Nevertheless, the court
argued that the parties’ demonstrable efforts to reduce the risk
showed that they intended not to allocate the residual risk.  In its
view, the parties considered that risk so remote that it was not worth
allocating.  This explains and justifies ALCOA’s failure to bother with
drafting a floor to protect itself against the remote risk that the con-
tract’s price index would not function as ALCOA anticipated.  Thus,
the court concluded, ALCOA did not assume the risk through any of
the four ways by which a party can do so.171
(quoting Brief of Appellant at 16 n.9, Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., No. 80-
1604 (3d Cir. 1980)).
169 ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 69.
170 Id. at 70.
171 Id. at 67–70 (explaining that ALCOA did not assume risk expressly, through
common understanding or trade usage, according to general policies, or through conscious
ignorance). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981) (stating
that party assumes risk of mistake by agreement of parties, conscious treatment of limited
knowledge with respect to mistake-related facts as sufficient, or reasonable allocation by
court).  In applying this provision to the facts of the case, the court first rejected the argu-
ment that, by not including a floor in the price term, ALCOA expressly or implicitly
agreed to bear the risk that the escalator might rise too slowly.  499 F. Supp. at 68.  The
court found that ALCOA considered the possibility that a floor might be necessary too
remote to put into the contract.  The court also rejected Essex’s argument that the contract
should be interpreted against its drafter, ALCOA, because according to the court, that
interpretive maxim is only appropriate when there is ambiguity or a policy concern, neither
of which were present in the case. Id. at 69.  As to whether ALCOA assumed the risk by
proceeding in the face of conscious ignorance of the risk, the court said that the test is not
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The court’s conclusion that the risk was not allocated to ALCOA
in the contract is certainly possible, but it is highly improbable.  Even
if both parties—perhaps because of Greenspan’s role in drafting the
index—believed the probability that the price index would malfunc-
tion was extremely low, it does not follow that ALCOA, let alone
Essex, understood the contract to be subject to the condition that the
index function as the parties anticipated it would.  Indeed, if both par-
ties believed the contract was, in effect, conditional on the price index
functioning to limit the range of price variation to no more than 3
cents per pound, it is difficult to explain why Essex insisted on a price
ceiling on the index.  Insisting on a price ceiling reflects the realization
that the index would not work as anticipated.  Since Essex did include
a price ceiling, it is difficult to explain how ALCOA could reasonably
conclude that Essex believed the contract was conditional on the price
index working as predicted.172
3. The Ex Post Justification:  Honoring the Parties’ Intent
The court’s focus on contractual intention is critical to its analysis
of the doctrinal grounds it used to justify reformation.  The price
index, the court reasoned, was designed to reduce, if not eliminate, the
deviation between contract price and market price.  Thus, this con-
tract was unlike a standard fixed price contract where the risk of price
increases is allocated to the seller and the risk of price declines is
assigned to the buyer.  Here the objective of the parties was to “avoid
the full risk of future economic changes” by using the complex price
indexing mechanism.173  In this way, the intent was to limit each
partner’s risk in a particular way:  to provide Essex “an objective
pricing formula” and to give ALCOA “a formula which would cover
whether they were aware at some level that uncertainty existed, but rather whether they
believed the uncertainty was limited (which ALCOA did). Id. at 69, 70.  Finally, the court
noted that there was no reason to allocate the risk to ALCOA, nor did customary dealing
call for ALCOA to assume the risk. Id. at 67.
172 The court also considered impracticability and frustration, which have the same basic
doctrinal requirements as mistake, but focus on the hardship imposed on the plaintiff.
ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 70–71 (“In broad outline the doctrines of impracticability and of
frustration of purpose resemble the doctrine of mistake.”).  The court found for ALCOA
on both of these grounds based on its $60 million expected loss resulting from the failure of
the index. Id. at 70–78.  The court applied its findings on the mistake issue to the impracti-
cability issue, finding that the nonoccurrence of the event (and the nonexistence of the
fact) that caused the impracticability was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made.  The difficulty envisioned in the impracticability doctrine, according to the court,
must be extreme and unreasonable:  In this case, the loss was so significant in absolute size
and proportion to the value of the contract that it altered the essential nature of perform-
ance. Id. at 72–74.
173 Id. at 63.
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its out-of-pocket costs over the years and yield a return of around four
cents a pound.”174  As a consequence, the failure of the price index to
achieve the ends sought by this contract justified invocation of each of
the three doctrines the court used to relieve ALCOA from full lia-
bility under the contract.  In short, under the Restatement, the failure
of the price index to achieve the parties’ ends was (a) “a mistake of
both parties . . . as to a basic assumption” of the contract justifying
rescission on the grounds of mutual mistake,175 (b) the occurrence of
an event whose nonoccurrence was a basic assumption of the contract
justifying an excuse on the grounds of commercial impracticability,176
and (c) the occurrence of an event whose nonoccurrence was a basic
assumption that frustrated ALCOA’s principal purposes under the
contract.177
Viewed ex post, the decision in ALCOA may seem justifiable.
Indeed, Victor Goldberg, who sharply criticizes the transactional law-
yers who wrote the ALCOA-Essex contract and the litigators who
argued the case, nonetheless concludes that “the judge imposed a
cost-plus gloss on the contract which was not explicit in the contract
but most likely comported with the parties’ intentions.”178  But this
understanding of the parties’ intentions mistakenly equates contrac-
tual intent with the parties’ intended contractual ends.  While the
court may well have correctly recognized the parties’ contractual ends,
it failed to take account of the contractual mechanisms that serve as
essential means of achieving those ends.  This point can best be appre-
ciated by turning the focus of analysis away from the ex post litigation
perspective assumed by the court to the ex ante perspective of the
parties charged with designing the contract.  From the vantage point
of contract design, the ALCOA decision takes on a much different
cast.
B. A Contract Design Explanation of the ALCOA-Essex Contract
1. Reframing the Question of Intent
In a case like ALCOA, where both parties were clearly aware of
the risk that the price index might not achieve ALCOA’s profit objec-
tive, the fundamental question is whether the parties conditioned the
contract on the risk not materializing or whether they allocated the
risk between them.  The court found that the parties’ significant
174 Id.
175 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981).
176 Id. § 261.
177 Id. § 265.
178 GOLDBERG, supra note 154, at 369.
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efforts to reduce the risk were evidence that they conditioned their
agreement on the risk not materializing.  The court relied on these
efforts to demonstrate that the parties were motivated to reduce the
risk that the contract price and the market price of aluminum might
deviate significantly in the future, thus imposing large losses on one
party or the other.  But the issue is not whether the parties intended to
reduce this risk; clearly they did.  That they intended to devise an
indexing methodology that reduced the risk of deviation between
market price and contract price does not, however, provide any evi-
dence of their intent to condition their agreement on the residual risk
that the index might malfunction.
To see this point, it is helpful to return to the distinction we have
drawn between two kinds of contractual intent:  the parties’ intended
contractual means and their intended contractual ends.  The evidence
reflects that the parties intended to create a pricing mechanism that
tracked ALCOA’s costs (and thus implicitly tracked the market price
for the smelting services subject to a built-in price discount).  One
alternative would have been to agree to a cost-plus contract, one in
which ALCOA could recover its costs of performance plus an agreed
profit.  Cost-plus contracts have many problems, however.  They
reduce the seller’s incentives to economize on costs, they are hard to
monitor, and they require revelation and verification of confidential
information.179  So the parties may have been motivated instead to
create a verifiable proxy for a cost-plus contract that avoided these
difficulties.  From that perspective, the agreed-upon price index was
intended to allow ALCOA to recover its capital costs in the Warrick
plant plus a return on its investment and to permit Essex to obtain a
favorable price for the smelting services over the life of the contract.
These were the parties’ intended contractual ends.  But the question
before the court concerned the parties’ intended contractual means:
What instruments did the parties select in order to achieve their goal
of having the contract price track the market price of smelting
services?
2. The Choice of Contractual Means:  Rules Versus Standards
Parties shift costs between the front and back end of the con-
tracting process depending on exogenous factors such as the degree of
uncertainty and the relative costs of writing the contract.  They do this
by changing the character of the terms in the contract.180  To see how,
179 See id. at 363 (describing problems in designing cost-based contracts).
180 The following analysis of the tradeoff between rules and standards in contract design
draws on the discussion in Scott & Triantis, supra note 10, at 822–56 (discussing first, in
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recall that courts do not directly observe the effects of a contin-
gency—such as the oil shock in ALCOA—on which a contract is
implicitly conditioned.  Rather, they rely on evidence or proxies.  Con-
sider a simple example of how these evidentiary proxies work.  Units
of evidence (e.g., the oil shock’s causing carbon-based energy costs to
increase by 40%) prove directly whether a precise contract term (or
rule) is satisfied (e.g., “the contract price will be adjusted by x% if
ALCOA’s energy costs increase by more than 35%”). Now consider
a vague contract term (or standard), such as “the contract price is sub-
ject to adjustment if there are extraordinary increases in production
costs caused by extrinsic factors beyond ALCOA’s control.”  Vague
terms are one step further removed from the evidentiary units:  The
evidence may establish that the oil shock caused the cost of coal
power to increase by 40%, but then the court must determine how
much importance to give to that evidence compared to alternative fac-
tors (e.g., labor disputes, management’s decision to shift from hydroe-
lectric power to coal-based power, etc.).181
A precise rule is “noisy.”  It is inevitably under- and over-inclu-
sive relative to the underlying contractual purpose it is designed to
serve.182  But it also restricts the court’s discretion more severely and
thus reduces ex post enforcement costs.  With a precise rule, the par-
ties are increasing their investment in front-end transaction costs, but
by reducing the role of the court in litigation, back-end enforcement
costs will decline.  At the same time, the parties are exploiting their
informational advantage (they know their contractual ends and have
the right incentives to choose the best means to achieve them), but
they are sacrificing the hindsight advantage that a court might have.
A vague standard, on the other hand, has less noise because it can be
custom-tailored ex post to promote the parties’ contractual ends.
Since the parties cannot foresee all contingencies, they can use vague
contract terms to delegate to a court the task of completing the con-
tract ex post.  But vague terms increase enforcement costs because the
parties will be able to introduce further evidence to support their com-
Part I, differences in costs between front and back ends of contracting, and second, in Part
II, how parties decide between precise and vague contract terms).
181 According to Goldberg,
Warrick was the only Alcoa smelter that relied on coal for its electric power.
The remainder used hydroelectric power, power provided by [the Tennessee
Valley Authority], or natural gas.  The costs of all of Alcoa’s other smelters did
not rise with the price of oil.  So, while Warrick was Alcoa’s low cost plant
when it was built, the changing fuel prices made it far and away the highest
cost plant, post-1973.
GOLDBERG, supra note 154, at 356.
182 SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 3, at 390.
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peting positions on whether the standard is satisfied.  It follows that
parties will choose a precise term when they believe that tailoring to
their private information is more important than hedging against the
possible negative effects of future contingencies on contract perform-
ance.  Alternatively, when contractual obligations are highly contin-
gent on the realized state of the world and less dependent on the
parties’ private information, parties will be more inclined to use vague
standards.
There are thus two basic approaches to designing a price term in
long-term contracts such as the ALCOA-Essex deal.  The parties
could specify the contract price in terms of a broad standard:  “The
price shall be a reasonable price that guarantees ALCOA a profit of
not less than $.01 nor more than $.07 per pound.”  In the extreme, the
parties could omit any express price term at all, thereby delegating to
a court the task of imputing a reasonable price at the time and place
of delivery.183  By choosing a standard, the parties shift contracting
costs from the front end to the back end.  To optimize the total costs
of contracting, however, the parties must compare the back-end costs
(and benefits) of standards to the front-end costs (and benefits) of a
precise and conclusive price term.  This alternative strategy requires
parties to incur ex ante the costs of specifying a rule:  a precise pricing
mechanism that achieves their contractual ends subject to an accept-
able risk of deviation from those ends.184  Here, the parties economize
on back-end enforcement costs and also exploit their informational
advantage in understanding their contractual ends.  But unlike the
standards approach, when the parties reduce the price term to a rule,
they anticipate no role for a court ex post in selecting a proxy in the
event the precise term does not function as predicted.
In short, parties face the familiar tradeoff of standards versus
rules.  Under either approach, the parties might fail fully to achieve
their contractual ends.  Courts might misinterpret a standard and
select a poor proxy, thereby undermining the parties’ ends.  Alterna-
183 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (amended 2003) (“The parties if they so intend may con-
clude a contract for sale even if the price is not settled.  In such a case the price is a
reasonable price at the time for delivery if:  (a) nothing is said as to the price; (b) the price
is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or (c) the price is to be fixed in
terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or
agency and it is not so set or recorded.”).
184 The advantage of contractual rules is that the parties themselves know better than
the courts what their objectives are and presumably can specify a proxy that best enhances
contractual incentives.  Moreover, by making proof of the price term trivial, a rule reduces
the expected costs of adjudication.  The chief disadvantage of a rule is that it might not
achieve the objective the parties intended.  Like all rules, a precise price term, no matter
how sophisticated, is likely to be over- or under-inclusive over a large range of possible
future circumstances.
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tively, a price term framed as a rule might fail to function as predicted
once the future state of the world is realized.  The tradeoff, as noted
above, is between the parties’ informational advantage in knowing
their contractual ends and the court’s informational advantage in
knowing what future states have materialized.  Contract design theory
argues that the parties themselves are best able to fully evaluate this
tradeoff and select the particular contractual means that maximizes
the expected value of their contract.
3. Determining the Chosen Contractual Means
Returning to ALCOA, we can now focus on the central question
in the case:  What were the parties’ intended contractual means for
achieving their objective?  The key point is that both the rules-based
and the standards-based approaches are consistent with the parties’
intended contractual ends of having the contract price track ALCOA’s
costs.  The question is which strategy the parties adopted as the means
of achieving those ends.  In ALCOA, the evidence strongly suggests
that ALCOA and Essex both understood that they were using the
rule-based approach.  The parties incurred substantial front-end
drafting costs.  These costs are rational to incur only if they exploit the
parties’ informational advantage and/or create offsetting savings in
expected enforcement costs (including the strategic consequences
attending adjudication).  If the parties preferred an ex post determina-
tion of the contract price, they could have forgone the substantial
investment in drafting a price index designed to replicate a cost-plus
contract.185  If the goal was to exploit a court’s hindsight advantage,
the parties could have drafted a vague standard that gave the court
discretion to determine the appropriate proxy.  Instead, ALCOA’s
drafting strategy seemed plainly designed to achieve the benefits, and
incur the costs, of a rule-based approach.
By choosing a precisely defined price index, sophisticated parties
implicitly allocate to the seller the risk that the index might malfunc-
tion and increase too slowly, and allocate to the buyer the risk that the
185 The contract does not explicitly state that it was intended to mimic a cost-plus con-
tract while avoiding familiar difficulties with cost-plus agreements; “[n]onetheless, the
structure of the agreement makes it quite clear that the intent was to make the contract
cost-based.” GOLDBERG, supra note 154, at 363.  To be sure, the agreed-upon indexing
formula in the contract had many other problems, in addition to the failure of the WPI-IC
to track carbon-based fuel costs. See id. at 363–65.  But the mere fact that commercial
parties design an ex ante rule badly does not justify judicial action to rewrite a precise
contract term ex post.  Indeed, one of the major reasons for inserting caps and floors in
such indices is to guard against other risks, in addition to the risk of low-probability/high-
impact states of the world.  Among those risks is the risk of formulation error by the par-
ties themselves.
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index might malfunction and increase too rapidly.  The court claimed
to be maintaining fidelity to the parties’ contractual intent by
reforming the price index when it did not function as the parties antic-
ipated it would.  Ironically, however, the court’s decision undermines
commercial parties’ ability to design their contracts optimally.  Even if
the court correctly interpreted the parties’ intended ends in this case,
the prospect of judicial intervention under these circumstances none-
theless impairs the ability of future commercial parties to choose the
contractual means that best achieve their contractual ends.
But does this analysis imply that a claim of mutual mistake or
excuse necessarily should be rejected whenever parties choose a con-
tractual rule rather than a standard?  To answer this question, let us
contrast ALCOA with Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp.,186 another
case involving a malfunctioning price index.  Here the parties entered
into a long term contract for the sale of jet fuel at designated loca-
tions.187  Their objective was to set a price for the jet fuel in such a
way as “to allocate the risk of exogenous changes in the input price of
crude oil to Eastern Air Lines and the risk of fluctuations in produc-
tion costs to Gulf.”188  They settled on a precise term that adjusted the
contract price according to an easily verifiable indicator of crude oil
price—West Texas Sour crude “as listed . . . in Platts Oilgram
Service.”189  Subsequently, as a result of governmental deregulation
following the oil crisis in the 1970s, Platts Oilgram seriously under-
stated the current market price of crude oil; the court declined to
grant Gulf relief on the grounds of excuse,190 perhaps because the par-
ties could have anticipated the failure of the contract indicator by
stating in the contract that the price would be tied to that of Platts
Oilgram or “any other appropriate index.”
The question for a court in a case such as Eastern Air Lines,
therefore, is whether to select a substitute indicator when the parties
fail to delegate expressly to the court the choice of a replacement if
the designated index should fail.  Clearly, this specific risk was too
remote to occur to the parties:  Neither party considered the possi-
bility that oil would be deregulated and that Platts Oilgram would not
report that unregulated price.  Because the price index was neither
complex nor expensive to create, there is less reason than in ALCOA
to believe the parties’ intended contractual means for replicating input
prices was a conclusive price term.  On the other hand, that fact also
186 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
187 Id. at 432.
188 Scott & Triantis, supra note 10, at 843.
189 Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 433 (quoting contract).
190 Id. at 440.
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suggests that it would have been relatively simple for the parties to
have specified a replacement index.191
Eastern Air Lines therefore presents a test case for the general
question of whether courts should ever intervene to modify clear,
express contract terms in light of changed circumstances in the
absence of an express request for ex post intervention in the contract.
When courts do so, they use the doctrines of excuse, mistake, frustra-
tion, or commercial impracticability either to void the contract and
return the parties to their precontract positions or to change the con-
tract’s terms to better align them with the parties’ contractual ends
given the changed circumstances.  The ALCOA decision presses these
doctrines beyond their traditional domain by using them to reallocate
a loss resulting from a risk that the parties quite clearly contem-
plated.192  Nevertheless, at bottom, the decision in ALCOA implicitly
assumes that the actual events that transpired in that case were no
different in kind from the failure of Platts Oilgram to report the der-
egulated price of crude oil in Eastern Air Lines.  In both cases, the
parties never contemplated the highly unlikely events that material-
ized and thus neither contract can properly be interpreted as having
allocated the risks of these events.  In short, the ALCOA court’s anal-
ysis of the excuse doctrines is premised on a conceptual argument:
Contractual liability is confined to losses caused by events whose risks
were allocated by contract, but contracts cannot allocate risks that the
parties did not consider.  Therefore, losses caused by events that the
parties did not consider cannot have been allocated by contract.
The problem with this argument is that it contains a false, sup-
pressed premise—namely, that some risks are not contemplated by
contracting parties.  At some level of generality, all parties consider
every risk because they assume the general risk that something might
go wrong.  Any specific risk the parties did not consciously consider
(e.g., the risk of an embargo combined with inflation and increased
demand) can be recast as an instance of a more general risk type they
certainly did consider (e.g., the risk that economic and political factors
might negatively affect the performance of their contract).193  Simi-
191 Note that the parties in ALCOA included such a clause in their contract. See supra
note 155.
192 By their own terms, these doctrines apply only to losses resulting from a “basic
assumption” the parties shared that turns out to be wrong because of “circumstances not
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.”  U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1
(amended 2003).  Given that ALCOA and Essex negotiated over and agreed to an express
price ceiling, their belief that the price index would not malfunction cannot qualify as a
basic assumption under the mistake or excuse doctrines.
193 See generally George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks:  A Cri-
tique of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450 (1992) (chal-
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larly, any specific risk that the parties did consider (e.g., that events in
the Middle East might adversely affect energy costs) can always be
recast under a more specific definition that the parties did not con-
sider (e.g., that Saudi Arabia would lead an OPEC embargo that
would combine with inflation caused by a decrease in aggregate
supply in the economy and with an increase in the world-wide demand
for aluminum).  Given that any event description admits of infinite
levels of specificity or generality, the excuse doctrines require some
nonarbitrary and operational method of settling on the proper level of
description of events that should be used to determine the doctrines’
applicability in any given case.  No such method exists in principle, let
alone in practice.
In consequence, the excuse doctrines in contract law lack a satis-
factory explanatory or normative foundation.  Especially given the
availability of express force majeure clauses (which set out detailed,
prescribed grounds for excusing contract performance), it is hard to
defend a set of interpretive default rules that license or require courts
to hold that promises in contracts between commercially sophisticated
parties are always implicitly conditional on the nonoccurrence of
events not contemplated (under some level of description) by the par-
ties.  Yet this is precisely what the excuse doctrines do.  In contrast,
contract design theory argues that unless express contract terms pro-
vide otherwise, courts should resist the temptation to use the excuse
doctrines to imply conditions into contracts between commercially
sophisticated parties, even if the events that occur were not, under a
description at some salient level of specificity, contemplated by the
parties.
Our claim that commercial parties have strong reasons, at least in
theory, to prefer courts not to apply doctrines of excuse or mistake
unless specifically requested to do so is also supported by the available
empirical evidence.  Geoffrey Miller’s recent study comparing
lenging assumption that contracting parties are unable to rationally manage and allocate
risks of unanticipated events).  Triantis argues:
While an unknown risk cannot be priced and allocated specifically, it can be
priced and allocated as part of the package of a more broadly framed risk.  For
example, consider a party who agrees to transport a shipment of goods for a
fixed fee.  The risk of a nuclear accident in the Middle East that causes a dra-
matic decrease in the production of oil and a consequent increase in its price
might not be foreseen.  As a result, this risk cannot be allocated explicitly in
the contract.  However, the broader risk of a large increase in the price of oil
for any reason can be.  Therefore, there is no gap to be filled by the doctrine of
impracticability:  [T]he risk of nuclear accident, though unforeseen, is allocated
implicitly.  Instead, the doctrine alters the contractual allocation of the risk and
its proponents must advance a rationale for the reallocation.
Id. at 452.
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California and New York contract doctrines seeks to explain why
commercial parties exhibit such a strong preference for New York
contract law over that of other jurisdictions, especially California.194
Miller’s analysis shows that New York is less willing to relieve parties
of their commitments on the basis of mistake or excuse.195  “New
York law allows rescission or reformation on the basis of mutual mis-
take of law only in limited circumstances,” which is “[c]onsistent with
its general philosophy of holding parties to their bargains.”196
California, on the other hand, is more receptive to pleas for relief
from mistake and excuse:  “Instead of emphasizing the importance of
respecting the parties’ written agreement, California courts focus on
the requirement of mutual consent.”197  Moreover, because of
California’s liberal rules for admitting extrinsic evidence, either party
has ample opportunity to invite the California courts to privilege con-
tractual ends over their chosen means.198  Though courts may believe
194 Miller, supra note 146; see also Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 148, at 21, 27 (pro-
viding empirical evidence showing parties choose New York law in about 46% of contracts
studied while choosing California law in less than 8% of contracts even though parties
choose California as place of business more frequently than New York).
195 Miller, supra note 146, at 37–39.
196 Id. at 37; see also Nash v. Kornblum, 186 N.E.2d 551, 553 (N.Y. 1962) (finding that
mistake must be shown by clear and convincing evidence); Lacoparra v. Bellino, 745
N.Y.S.2d 693, 694 (App. Div. 2002) (same); Jossel v. Meyers, 629 N.Y.S.2d 9, 10–11 (App.
Div. 1995) (“Where the parties have made an instrument as they intended it should be, and
the instrument expresses the transaction as it was understood and designed to be made,
then the party who had an opportunity to know the contents of the instrument cannot
obtain cancellation or reformation because he misunderstood the legal effect . . . .”).
197 Miller, supra note 146, at 38; see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1550, 1565, 1580 (West
1982) (“Consent is not mutual, unless the parties agree upon the same thing in the same
sense.”); Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 277 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting
importance of “parties’ outward manifestations” of mutual consent).  Miller writes:
The necessity that the parties agree to the same thing at the same time makes it
relatively easy for parties to frame claims for relief under this theory.
California courts do not emphasize the restrictions that limit the availability of
mutual mistake under New York law, such as the lack of fault on the part of
the party seeking relief or the need for clear and convincing evidence to estab-
lish the claim.
Miller, supra note 146, at 38–39.
198 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE, § 1856(e), (g) (West 2007) (setting out exceptions to rule
excluding parole evidence); Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 83 P.3d 497, 502 (Cal. 2004)
(finding that parol evidence rule “does not . . . prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evi-
dence ‘to explain the meaning of a written contract . . . [if] the meaning urged is one to
which the written contract terms are reasonably susceptible’” (quoting BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 209 Cal. Rptr. 50, 57 n.4 (Ct. App. 1984))).  Note also that
“[r]eformation is liberally available in California if mistake is shown, provided that the
changed terms do not affect substantial rights of third parties.”  Miller, supra note 146, at
39.  The California Civil Code states that,
When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one
party, which the other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does
not truly express the intention of the parties, it may be revised on the applica-
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doing so leads to the most just result, such privileging of ends over
means can significantly impair the ability of commercially sophisti-
cated parties to form optimal contracts.
IV
CONDITIONS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
EXPRESS TERMS
The preceding discussion has outlined a theory of contractual
design that focuses on two salient strategies available to contracting
parties intent on maximizing expected surplus.  First, the parties must
decide which portions of their agreement are to be legally enforceable
and which portions should be enforced relationally.  To do this, they
partition their agreement into legally enforceable and unenforceable
components; the latter are not included in the written document.
Second, the parties must then address the design challenge of formu-
lating the terms of their legally enforceable contract.  Here, they
choose between precise and vague terms as the means of shifting con-
tracting costs between the front and back ends of the contracting pro-
cess.  Both of these strategies rely on the ability of parties to use
formal contract doctrine in a predictable fashion.  But, as we discussed
in Part I, formal contract doctrine may be overridden by courts
employing equitable doctrines to achieve ex post outcomes that com-
port with the parties’ contractual ends.  In this Part, we explore in
depth the sharp rift between these two stages of the contemporary
adjudicatory regime.  We expose a deep-seated conflict in the law of
conditions between formal contract doctrines requiring strict enforce-
ment of express terms and equitable doctrines permitting abrogation
of those terms when strict enforcement appears to frustrate the par-
ties’ contractual ends.  We argue that courts undermine the reliability
of basic doctrinal tools essential for contract design when they set
aside clear express terms ex post in order to vindicate contractual
ends.
A. The Tension over the Interpretation of Express Terms
The formal contract interpretation doctrines direct courts to
respect the parties’ express terms.  Express terms can specify both pri-
mary terms governing the parties’ performance obligations and secon-
dary, or meta, terms governing the interpretation of their agreement.
tion of a party aggrieved, so as to express that intention, so far as it can be
done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good faith and
for value.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3399 (West 1997).
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For example, as discussed in Part II.A, express written terms can con-
strain a court’s interpretive discretion by directing the court under the
parol evidence doctrine not to admit prior evidence of implied
terms.199  Express terms therefore provide the most powerful tool
available to parties for selecting the contractual means that best pro-
mote their contractual objectives:  In principle, express terms not only
allow the parties to communicate to each other and to courts the pre-
cise content of the terms they wish to include in their agreement, but
they also allow the parties to control the extent to which courts may
imply additional terms into their agreement.200  However, because
express terms themselves require interpretation, a court’s tendency to
equate contractual intent with the parties’ intended contractual ends
can lead it to impress novel meanings on express terms or imply addi-
tional terms that alter the content of the parties’ agreement.
The doctrines governing the interpretation of express terms thus
present yet another occasion on which courts can undermine the par-
ties’ intended contractual means in order to promote their intended
ends.  For example, courts have long been divided on the question of
whether express terms should be given a so-called contextual or a
plain meaning interpretation.201  Under the contextual view, the inter-
pretation of express terms inevitably requires judicial speculation
about what meaning the parties were likely to have attached to the
express terms they used.  Thus, courts that identify contractual intent
with the parties’ contractual ends will assign to express terms a
meaning that, at the time of adjudication, best promotes those ends
instead of seeking to identify the meaning that reflects the contractual
means the parties most likely intended at the time of formation.202
199 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202 (amended 2003) (evidence not admissible to prove addi-
tional terms consistent with express terms of fully integrated writing); id. § 2-208(2)
(express terms control course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 (1981) (evidence of prior or contempora-
neous agreements or negotiations not admissible to contradict term of writing); id. § 216(1)
(evidence of consistent additional term not admissible to supplement fully integrated
agreement).
200 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 102, at 281–83 (arguing that express terms are signals
that enable parties to opt out of implied default terms and to supplement defaults with
additional customized terms); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 584–89 (asserting that
maximizing party control over express terms promotes efficient contracting).
201 See SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 3, at 543–45, 578–602 (discussing differences
between “plain meaning” and “contextual” modes of interpretation); Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 6, at 584 (arguing that most parties would prefer plain meaning interpretation
because it would “(1) reduce contracting costs; (2) minimize the opportunities for strategic
behavior; (3) reduce the risk of judicial error; and (4) expand the set of efficient contracts
parties could write”).  For discussion, see cases cited supra notes 145–47.
202 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d
641, 646 & n.9 (Cal. 1968) (finding context evidence admissible to show that promise to
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Under the plain meaning view, however, courts ultimately base con-
tract interpretation on their common knowledge of word meaning
rather than context-based speculation about intent.203  Yet even under
a plain meaning regime, the interpretation of express terms can be
significantly influenced by a court’s desire to vindicate contractual
ends instead of means.  The plain meaning rule does not apply if a
court finds an express term to be ambiguous; a court’s threshold
determination of whether an express term is ambiguous can be influ-
enced by its perception of the effect various interpretations would
have on the parties’ contractual ends.204  This deep tension between
the formal obligation to respect the parties’ ex ante specifications
through express terms and the desire to vindicate the parties’ contrac-
tual objectives ex post is most vividly illustrated in the law of condi-
tions, to which we now turn.
B. The Schizophrenic Law of Conditions
Since parties incur duties in contracts by making promises, a
party who makes an event a condition of its promise is under a duty to
perform that promise only if the event occurs.205  A common example
indemnify plaintiff against “all loss, damage, expense and liability” does not require defen-
dant to indemnify plaintiff for injuries to plaintiff’s property); In re Soper’s Estate, 264
N.W. 427, 431–33 (Minn. 1935) (finding context evidence admissible to show that reference
to “wife” in will does not mean person to whom testator was legally married).
203 For example, in Cernohorsky v. Northern Liquid Gas Co., the court said:
The language of a contract must be understood to mean what it clearly
expresses.  A court may not depart from the plain meaning of a contract where
it is free from ambiguity.  In construing the terms of a contract, where the
terms are plain and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to construe it as it
stands, even though the parties may have placed a different construction on it.
68 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Wis. 1955) (citation omitted).  For more cases exemplifying the plain
meaning view, see 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 30:6, at 82–83 n.38 (4th ed. 1999).
204 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 646 n.8 (“Extrinsic evidence has often been
admitted . . . on the stated ground that the contract was ambiguous.  This statement of the
rule is harmless if it is kept in mind that the ambiguity may be exposed by extrinsic evi-
dence that reveals more than one possible meaning.” (citation omitted)).  Even if a court
concludes that an express term has a plain meaning, it can narrow or expand that meaning
in order to vindicate the parties’ contractual ends. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co.
v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that trade usage and course of
performance evidence could vary normal meaning of “price protection” clause); Brunswick
Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that evidence
of course of performance could vary normal meaning of “F.A.S.” term in written contract).
205 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981).  The event on which the
promise is conditioned is “largely within the control of the obligor (the homeowner’s
honest satisfaction with the paint job), the obligee (the insured’s furnishing proof of loss),
or a third person (the bank’s approval of the mortgage application), or is largely beyond
the control of anyone (damage as a result of fire).”  2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, § 8.2,
at 395.
October 2009] CONTRACT DESIGN AND CONTRACTUAL INTENT 1081
is an insurance contract that imposes on the insurer a duty to pay if
the insured brings a claim within a specified time period after the
insured suffers a covered loss.  The insurer’s duty to pay arises when
the insured suffers a covered loss, but that duty is discharged if the
insured fails to bring the claim within the specified time period.  The
law of conditions explicitly endorses the principle of freedom of con-
tract by committing to the strict enforcement of all express condi-
tions.206  Yet, it is also home to the hoary equitable maxim that “the
law abhors forfeitures.”207  The antiforfeiture norm suffuses the law of
conditions, which therefore reads like a schizophrenic text, in one sen-
tence insisting on the sanctity of strict construction and enforcement
of conditions in spite of forfeiture,208 while in the next admonishing
courts, whenever interpretation allows, to avoid the conclusion that
206 Renovest Co. v. Hodges Dev. Corp., 600 A.2d 448, 452–53 (N.H. 1991) (“[W]hen the
parties expressly condition their performance upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of an
event, rather than simply including the event as one of the general terms of the contract,
the parties’ bargained-for expectation of strict compliance should be given effect.”); see
also Nielsen v. Provident Sav. Life Assurance Soc’y, 66 P. 663, 665 (Cal. 1901)
(“[C]onditions[,] . . . when made, must be construed and enforced . . . according to the
expressed understanding of the parties making them.  It is not for the courts to dispense
with such limitations and conditions, nor by judicial legislation to insert a different contract
from that deliberately made by the parties.”).
207 JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 102(A), at 641 (4th ed.
2001); see also, e.g., Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 116 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 1962) (“[It is a]
well-recognized principle that forfeitures are not favored either in law or equity. . . . One
claiming forfeiture carries a heavy burden of establishing his right thereto by clear and
unmistakable proof.”); Stevenson v. Parker, 608 P.2d 1263, 1267–68 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)
(“This court has held the general doctrine that forfeitures are not favored in the law, and
that courts should promptly seize upon any circumstance . . . that would indicate an elec-
tion or an agreement to waive the harsh, and at times unjust, remedy of forfeiture . . . .”).
The Restatement defines “forfeiture” as the denial of compensation for losses the prom-
isee incurs when “[t]he non-occurrence of a condition of [the promisor]’s duty . . . cause[s]
the [promisee] to lose his right to the agreed exchange after he has relied substantially on
the expectation of that exchange . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227
cmt. b (1981).
208 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b (1981) (“The policy favoring
freedom of contract requires that, within broad limits . . . the agreement of the parties
should be honored even though forfeiture results.”); id. § 226 cmt. c (“[T]o the extent that
the parties have, by a term of their agreement, clearly made an event a condition, they can
be confident that a court will ordinarily feel constrained strictly to apply that term . . . .”);
id. § 229 cmt. a (“[I]f the term that requires the occurrence of the event as a condition is
expressed in unmistakable language, the possibility of forfeiture will not affect the inter-
pretation of that language.”); see also Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 670 A.2d 19, 21 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“‘[E]quity’s jurisdiction in relieving against a forfeiture is to be
exercised with caution . . . [A] court of equity will not interfere to substitute a different and
more liberal agreement’ than that which existed between the parties.” (quoting Dunkin’
Donuts of Am. v. Middletown Donut Corp., 495 A.2d 66, 74 (N.J. 1985) and, Fox v.
Haddon Twp., 45 A.2d 193, 196 (N.J. Ch. 1945))).
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the promisor’s obligation is subject to an enforceable condition if
enforcement of the condition would raise the specter of forfeiture.209
The antiforfeiture norm takes both an ex ante and ex post form.
In its ex ante form, the antiforfeiture norm controls the interpretation
of whether an obligation is subject to a condition.210  The ex ante ver-
sion of the antiforfeiture norm applies when the language of an agree-
ment fails to make clear whether it is intended to subject the
promisor’s duty to a condition, to impose a duty on the promisee, or
both.  For example, an employment contract might provide that the
employer shall not terminate the employee without just cause, but
also provide a clause stating that “the employee will, within thirty
days of termination, give written notice to the employer of any claim
of wrongful termination and will not take any legal action based on
the claim within six months of such notice.”211  Suppose that after
being terminated without cause the employee violates this provision
by failing to provide written notice of his claim.  A court could inter-
pret the clause as a promise by the employee to provide written
notice.  On this interpretation, the employer remains subject to suit
for wrongful discharge but would be entitled to recover damages from
the employee for breach of her promise.  A court might instead inter-
pret this language as creating a condition precedent to the employee’s
right to sue for breach of the employer’s promise not to terminate
without just cause.  On this view, the employee’s failure to satisfy the
condition would relieve the employer of any liability for wrongful dis-
209 See, e.g., Bornholdt v. S. Pac. Co., 327 F.2d 18, 20 (9th Cir. 1964) (“A condition
involving a forfeiture must be strictly interpreted against the party for whose benefit it is
created. . . . Where there are two possible constructions, one of which leads to a forfeiture
and the other avoids it, the rule of law is well settled . . . that the construction which avoids
forfeiture must be made if it is at all possible.” (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1442 (West
2007))); Kalina v. Eckert, 497 A.2d 1384, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“[A] provision will
not be construed to result in a forfeiture unless no other reasonable construction is pos-
sible.”); Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 (Wyo. 1965) (“Even as a general rule
conditions, if possible, are to be construed ‘so as not to operate as a forfeiture of the rights
of the parties.’” (quoting Pac.-Wyo. Oil Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 226 P. 193, 198 (Wyo.
1924))).
210 Courts use general principles of interpretation to identify and distinguish conditions
and duties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. a (1981).  In addition,
courts have developed specialized principles for resolving interpretive questions regarding
conditions. See id. (“There are also some special standards of preference that are of partic-
ular applicability to conditions, and these are set out in § 227.”).  The ex ante version of the
antiforfeiture norm falls into this second category.
211 A contractual provision similar to this appears in Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling Co.,
369 P.2d 498, 499 n.2, 500 (Alaska 1962) (finding that provision is not “unfair or unreason-
able”).  Employment contracts often contain such provisions to give the employer the
opportunity to settle disputes and take measures to prevent ongoing or future violations of
contractual or statutory provisions.
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charge.212  Following the antiforfeiture maxim, contract law regards
the employee’s detrimental reliance on the just cause restriction on
termination—in which the employee forfeits any claim for wrongful
discharge by failing to notify the employer—as a forfeiture to be
avoided, whenever the contract’s express language and circumstances
allow, by favoring an interpretation of the term as creating a promis-
sory duty rather than a condition.213
The rationale underlying these interpretive rules is not that the
law should intervene to prevent forfeitures that have materialized
under an agreement but rather that the promisee is unlikely to have
agreed to a risk of forfeiture at the time of formation.214  Thus, if
finding that a promise is subject to a condition would impose a forfei-
ture on the promisee but the parties would not have understood the
condition to create such a risk at the time of formation, then the ex
ante antiforfeiture norm allows the courts to interpret the term as a
promise rather than a condition.
Even if the parties succeed in writing an express term that
unequivocally creates a condition, the ex post form of the antiforfei-
ture norm strongly encourages courts to exercise their discretion to
excuse the condition whenever its enforcement would create a forfei-
ture and the court deems the condition not to have been a material
part of the agreement at the time of formation.215  In addition, even if
212 A court might also interpret the language as creating both a promise and a condition,
in which case the employee’s failure to satisfy the contract terms not only relieves the
employer of liability but also subjects the employee to liability for breach of her promise.
213 For example, in United-Buckingham Freight Lines v. Riss & Co., the court held that
Any duty . . . to cooperate imposed upon plaintiff by . . . the contract is obvi-
ously in the nature of . . . a promise rather than a condition.  To permit [defen-
dant’s] construction of the covenant would be to construe it as a condition
precedent, the breach of which would result in a forfeiture [for the plain-
tiff]. . . . It is axiomatic that the law does not favor forfeitures.  Therefore, any
failure to cooperate . . . on the part of the plaintiff clearly could do no more
than breach an independent promise.
241 F. Supp. 861, 863 (D. Colo. 1965).  For an example in which the court construes a “pay
if paid” clause to be a promise rather than a condition because “it is a rule of construction
that a forfeiture, by finding a condition precedent, is to be avoided when another reason-
able reading of the contract exists,” see Sheldon L. Pollack Corp. v. Falcon Indus., Inc., 794
S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. App. 1990).
214 The Restatement explains:
Since the intentions of the parties must be taken as of the time the contract
was made, the test is whether a particular interpretation would have avoided
the risk of forfeiture viewed as of that time, not whether it will avoid actual
forfeiture in the resolution of a dispute that has arisen later.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b (1981).
215 See id. § 229 (“To the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition would cause
disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence of that condition unless
its occurrence was a material part of the agreed exchange.”).
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a court agrees that a contract contains a material, express condition,
the ex post norm encourages the court to find that the promisor has
implicitly waived the condition, either retrospectively or prospec-
tively, whenever enforcement of the condition would create a
forfeiture.216
In sum, the law of conditions explicitly stacks the deck heavily
against the finding and enforcement of conditions on the ground that
the law abhors a forfeiture.  In the discussion that follows, we argue
that the antiforfeiture norm is based on two false assumptions.  The
first is that parties are unlikely to select terms that create the risk of
forfeiture.  This assumption underlies the doctrine directing courts to
avoid finding a condition absent express language that unmistakably
creates it.  The second assumption is that express conditions are some-
times not material at the time of formation.  This assumption under-
lies the doctrine directing courts to avoid enforcing even clear, express
conditions.
We have argued that considerations of contract design often favor
the selection of precise terms that create rule-like obligations that are
easy for the parties to observe and to enforce in court.  Express condi-
tions serve just this purpose:  They afford a promisor protection from
certain risks, in lieu of having to prove losses that may be difficult to
verify in a suit for damages.  When sophisticated commercial parties
clearly agree to express conditions, there is no systematic reason to
doubt that the promisee understood the risk of forfeiture and bar-
gained for compensating contractual benefits from the promisor.  On
this view, conditions are always material from the ex ante perspective
because they allocate risks between the parties, the contract compen-
sates each party for bearing those risks, and the parties inevitably rely
on that allocation of risks.  Since materiality is determined by the par-
ties’ intent at the time of formation, conditions will always be
material.
216 See, e.g., Knarston v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 73 P. 740, 741 (Cal. 1903) (“[T]he right
to declare a forfeiture, being a matter entirely for the benefit of a lessor or vendor, can be,
even by parol, effectually waived by either.”); Bielski v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 150 N.W.2d
788, 790 (Mich. 1967) (“[W]aivers [of contract clause requiring arbitration as condition
precedent to suit] need not be expressed in terms, but may be implied by the acts, omis-
sions, or conduct of the insurer or its agents authorized in such respect.”); Cochran v.
Grebe, 578 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (“Forfeitures are highly disfavored by the
law and the courts are therefore quick to find a waiver or estoppel in a case [producing
hardship].”); Miraldi v. Life Ins. Co., 356 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (stating
that law does not favor forfeiture and that waiver will be inferred whenever it reasonably
can be from facts); Brown v. Powell, 648 N.W.2d 329, 333 (S.D. 2002) (“Because forfeitures
of land sale contracts are highly disfavored by the law, courts are generally quick to find a
waiver of conditions alleged as a basis for a claim of breach.”).
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C. Express Conditions of Satisfaction:  Corthell v.
Summit Thread Co.
We have seen how the antiforfeiture norm gives rise to interpre-
tive rules favoring promises over conditions.  This norm also influ-
ences the interpretation of contracts that subject a promise to the
express condition of the promisor’s satisfaction with the promisee’s
performance.  If the express condition does not specify whether the
promise is subject to the promisor’s objectively reasonable satisfaction
or subjective but honest satisfaction, the law directs courts to prefer
the former unless it is not practicable to determine “objective reason-
ableness.”217  The rationale of this interpretive rule is that a promisee
ordinarily is unlikely to agree to subject himself to the idiosyncratic
tastes of the promisor in circumstances where objectively reasonable
satisfaction would be practical to ascertain.218  By its own terms, how-
ever, this rule applies only in the absence of clear language creating a
condition of honest, subjective satisfaction.219  Yet the equitable
instinct to avoid perceived forfeitures is so strong that it often over-
rides the doctrinal caveats directing courts to enforce such express
conditions even when they do create a forfeiture.  A court is especially
likely to misapply formal doctrine when the formal terms of a contract
would impose a forfeiture on a promisee and the court fails to under-
stand why it might have been rational for the promisee to agree to
subject himself to this risk.  To illustrate this tendency, we turn to a
case in which the court needed to decide the effect to give to a condi-
tion that appeared to make the promisor’s obligation illusory.
1. The Corthell-Summit Thread Contract
In Corthell v. Summit Thread Co.,220 Robert Corthell, an
employee of the Summit Thread Company, promised to turn over pat-
ents for three of his existing inventions, as well as all of his future
217 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 (1981) (“When it is a condition
of an obligor’s duty that he be satisfied with respect to the obligee’s performance or with
respect to something else, and it is practicable to determine whether a reasonable person in
the position of the obligor would be satisfied, an interpretation is preferred under which
the condition occurs if such a reasonable person in the position of the obligor would be
satisfied.”).
218 See id. § 228 cmt. b (“When, as is often the case, the preferred interpretation [i.e.
relying on an objective standard] will reduce the obligee’s risk of forfeiture, . . . there is an
additional argument in its favor.”).
219 See id. § 228 cmt. a (“If the agreement leaves no doubt that it is only honest satisfac-
tion that is meant and no more, it will be so interpreted, and the condition does not occur if
the obligor is honestly, even though unreasonably, dissatisfied.”).
220 167 A. 79 (Me. 1933).
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inventions, for a period of five years.221  In return for this, Summit
Thread promised to increase Corthell’s annual salary by $620 for five
years, make Corthell a onetime payment of $3500, and provide
Corthell additional “reasonable recognition” for his future inventions,
“the basis and amount of recognition to rest entirely with the Summit
Thread Company at all times.”222  The written agreement between the
parties additionally specified that the terms of the contract were “to
be interpreted in good faith on the basis of what is reasonable and
intended, and not technically.”223  During the term of the contract,
Corthell turned over four additional inventions to Summit Thread and
requested, but never received, additional payment for them as “rea-
sonable recognition” from Summit Thread.224  Corthell brought suit
seeking payment for the four inventions.  Summit Thread argued that
“the vagueness and uncertainty of [the reasonable recognition] provi-
sions relating to the price to be paid render[ed] the contract
unenforceable.”225
In the first part of the agreement, Summit Thread promised
Corthell reasonable recognition for his inventions.226  Had the con-
tract provision stopped there, standard interpretive canons should
have led a court to enforce it by implying a term requiring Summit
Thread to pay Corthell the value of his inventions according to an
objective standard.  But the agreement further stipulated that the
amount of recognition rested “entirely” within Summit Thread’s dis-
cretion.227  Summit Thread’s promise of reasonable recognition thus
expressly granted Summit Thread unfettered discretion to determine
the amount of recognition, if any, that was reasonable.  Under formal
contract doctrine, a promise is illusory if it is subject to a condition
that is entirely within the promisor’s control and the promisor incurs
no detriment by deciding not to satisfy that condition.228  Summit
221 Id. at 80.
222 Id.  By “reasonable recognition,” the parties apparently meant reasonable compen-
sation. Id. at 81 (“No contention is made that the term ‘reasonable recognition,’ as used in
the contract under consideration, means other than reasonable compensation . . . .”).
223 Id. at 82.
224 See id. at 80–81.
225 Id. at 81.
226 Id. at 80.
227 Id.
228 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a (1981) (“Words of promise
which by their terms make performance entirely optional with the ‘promisor’ do not consti-
tute a promise. . . . Where the apparent assurance of performance is illusory, it is not
consideration for a return promise.”); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 43 (1921) (“One of the commonest kind of promises too indefinite for legal enforcement
is where the promisor retains an unlimited right to decide later the nature or extent of his
performance.  This unlimited choice in effect destroys the promise and makes it merely
illusory.”).
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Thread’s promise thus appears to qualify as a classic illusory promise.
Historically, courts have refused to enforce illusory promises on the
ground that they are not supported by consideration.229  If the court in
Corthell had followed suit, it would have declared Summit Thread’s
promise unenforceable.  If Corthell had not yet performed, he also
would have been free from any legal obligation to turn over his inven-
tions.  But because Corthell had already performed by turning over
his inventions, he would have made a gratuitous transfer and there-
fore would have been denied recovery in contract.230
2. The Court’s Analysis
The court in Corthell instead implied a term imposing objective
duties on a promisor whose indefinite promise otherwise would be
unenforceable.  Although the court noted that reasonable recognition
was “coupled with the reservation that the ‘basis and amount of recog-
nition (was) to rest entirely with’ the company ‘at all times,’” it noted
that “[n]evertheless, the contract was ‘to be interpreted in good faith
on the basis of what is reasonable and intended, and not techni-
cally.’”231 On the basis of these provisions, the court concluded:
[T]he parties continued to exhibit a contractual intent and a con-
templation of the payment of reasonable compensation to the plain-
tiff for his inventions.  The company was not free to do exactly as it
chose.  Its promise was not purely illusory.  It was bound in good
faith to determine and pay the plaintiff the reasonable value of what
it accepted from him.232
The court’s justification for its interpretation appears to be that the
clause granting Summit Thread “entire” discretion to set the amount
of compensation is, on its face, inconsistent with the contract’s express
229 Paul v. Rosen, 122 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954); Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v.
Framers’ Lumber Co., 179 N.W. 417, 419–20 (Iowa 1920); Strong v. Sheffield, 39 N.E. 330
(N.Y. 1895).
230 Corthell could have sued in restitution for a quantum valebant recovery of the value
of the inventions he turned over to Summit Thread.  But in our view, a court that properly
ruled against recovery in contract would for the same reasons deny recovery in restitution
on the ground that Corthell accepted the risk that Summit Thread would retain his inven-
tions without paying him for them.
231 Corthell, 167 A. at 82.
232 Id.  The court offered no reason to believe that the literal interpretation of the word
“entirely” (as meaning entirely) was a technical definition, rather than the simple plain
meaning of the language the parties used.  As defendant argued in its brief, “if the basis
and amount of recognition lies entirely with the defendant at all times, it lies with the
defendant now, not with the plaintiff and not with any third party or parties, not even with
a court of law.”  Brief for the Defendant at 15, Corthell, 167 A. 79 (docket no. not avail-
able) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
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language requiring that the contract be interpreted in good faith.233
Presented with two clauses that it believed were inconsistent, the
court gave priority to the good faith term and effectively set aside the
clause granting Summit Thread unfettered discretion.234
But even when contracts contain no express language requiring
parties to act in good faith, contract law implies such a duty into all
contracts.235 Corthell then might be read to suggest that promises can
never be illusory, for the implied duty of good faith would always cure
an otherwise illusory promise by imposing enforceable duties on the
promisor.  Yet this is clearly not the case.  The illusory promise doc-
trine still operates to render a promise unenforceable when its clear
language unequivocally subjects the promise to a condition that is
entirely within the promisor’s control such that the promisor can
avoid satisfying the promise without incurring any detriment.236
Instead, courts use doctrines such as the implied duty of good faith to
impose duties on the promisor only if they find the promisee reason-
ably believed the promisor’s discretion was implicitly constrained.237
Thus, the implicit premise of the Corthell decision is that it was rea-
sonable for Corthell to believe that Summit Thread was undertaking
an obligation to pay an objectively reasonable amount in compensa-
tion for his inventions, and therefore intended to be legally bound by
its promise, despite the express contractual language stating that the
amount of compensation to be paid to Corthell rested “entirely” with
Summit Thread.238
The Corthell court, however, provides no plausible account of
why the parties expressly stipulated that the amount of recognition
was to rest entirely with Summit Thread.  As an interpretation of the
parties’ agreement, Corthell fails the basic requirement of providing at
least a minimally adequate account of the express language in the par-
233 Corthell, 167 A. at 80 (noting that contract includes following clause:  “All of the
above is to be interpreted in good faith on the basis of what is reasonable . . . ”).
234 Id. at 82.
235 U.C.C. § 1-304 (amended 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981).
236 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76 cmt. d (1981) (“Words of promise
do not constitute a promise if they make performance entirely optional with the purported
promisor. . . . [T]here may be consideration if forbearance from causing the condition to
occur would itself have been consideration if it alone had been bargained for.”).
237 See, e.g., Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625, 627–28 (Cal. 1958) (finding that “prom-
isor’s duty to exercise his judgment in good faith [was] adequate consideration to support
the contract” and that it prevented contract from “nullifying the consideration otherwise
present in the promises exchanged”); Seymour Grean & Co. v. Grean, 82 N.Y.S.2d 787,
788–89 (App. Div. 1948) (per curiam) (finding that employment contract was not illusory
because promisor was required to render substantial services and to act in good faith).
238 Corthell, 167 A. at 80, 82.
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ties’ writing.  The court simply treats the writing as if it did not contain
the word “entirely.”  Why would the court in Corthell insist on an
interpretation seemingly contradicted by the writing’s express lan-
guage?  The answer, we believe, is that it could not otherwise explain
why Corthell would have been willing to promise to transfer his future
inventions to Summit Thread.  If the parties intended Summit Thread
to have unfettered discretion to decide the amount, if any, of compen-
sation to be paid to Corthell after he turned over an invention, then
Corthell would be subjecting himself to the risk of giving something in
return for nothing.  Since the court was unable to explain why a mini-
mally rational party would promise to turn over potentially valuable
inventions without requiring that the beneficiary pay for any benefit it
received, the court simply dismissed the possibility that the parties
could have meant the word “entirely” to be taken seriously.  The
express clause directing the court to interpret the contract language in
good faith provided convenient linguistic cover to justify an interpre-
tation of the contract that eviscerated the plain meaning of the word
“entirely.”  The better understanding of that clause was not to under-
mine Summit Thread’s complete discretion to make an honest judg-
ment about the value of the invention but rather to prevent Summit
Thread from dishonestly claiming that no compensation was due for
inventions that had objectively verifiable value.
3. A Contract Design Explanation:  Conditions and Relational
Enforcement
The Corthell court’s apparent conclusion that no rational person
would have accepted the risk that Summit Thread would pay him
nothing in return for a valuable invention likely results from the
court’s failure to appreciate the role that asymmetric information and
relational enforcement play in designing contracts.239  Contract theory
teaches us that the more difficult information is to verify, the less
likely it is that parties will subject their contractual obligations to con-
ditions whose satisfaction can be proved only by verifying that infor-
mation.240  This basic principle suggests a perfectly reasonable story
239 The explanation for the court’s apparent failure to appreciate why reasonable com-
mercial parties might rationally choose relational enforcement over legal enforcement mir-
rors our analysis in Part II.B.2, supra, of the court’s decision in Hunt Foods.
240 Recent scholarship argues against the standard assumption underlying traditional
contract theory literature that information is either verifiable or not.  In fact, information
falls along a continuum of verifiability; where a piece of information falls on that con-
tinuum is a function of both its inherent character and the contingent rules of contract
interpretation and evidence law. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 10, at 825–26 (noting that
verifiability of contractual obligations at trial are highly context-specific and endogenous to
judicial process).
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explaining the plain language of the contract in Corthell.  Summit
Thread would not be willing to condition its performance obligation
on the objective value of Corthell’s inventions unless that value was
likely to be verifiable.  But that value was not likely to be easily verifi-
able.  First, as a general matter, the economic value of intellectual
property is often difficult to determine.  In this case, the value of
Corthell’s inventions is especially difficult to determine:  Like the pre-
vious inventions Corthell sold to Summit Thread,241 the inventions at
issue were relatively minor variations on the design of thread-handling
devices, such as spools, bobbins, and shuttles, that Summit Thread and
its customers used to store and sew the thread it manufactured.
Summit Thread manufactured and used spools, bobbins, and shuttles,
but it did not sell them.242  Thus, the value, if any, of these inventions
to Summit Thread consisted exclusively in the value placed on these
inventions by Summit Thread’s customers.  That value consisted either
in the increased ease of using the spools on which Summit Thread’s
thread was wound when delivered or in the increased effectiveness of
the sewing machine parts that Summit Thread supplied free of charge
to its customers.  Presumably, the easier it was for Summit Thread’s
customers to use Summit Thread’s thread and the more valuable
Summit Thread’s free machine parts were to its customers, the more
likely they would be to buy their thread from Summit Thread and to
pay a higher price for it.
241 Corthell’s early inventions were “bobbin control adjuncts” and “guarding attach-
ments for thread caps.”  Brief of the Plaintiff at 4, Corthell, 167 A. 79 (docket no. not
available) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
242 Corthell sought compensation for four inventions.  His first invention was a minor
variation on the “King Spool” on which Summit Thread spooled the thread it sold.  Brief
for the Defendant, supra note 232, at 16.  Corthell maintained that the principal value of
this invention was that it effected “the continuation of th[e] King Spool patent.”  Brief of
the Plaintiff, supra note 241, at 20.  He did not claim that the value of this invention was
attributable to any increase in the spool’s practical value.  Indeed, Corthell was prepared to
concede that the invention had never been used, let alone sold.  The second invention
consisted of “an adjunct to sewing machine shuttles to be attached to bobbins.”  Brief for
the Defendant, supra note 232, at 20.  However, “[Summit Thread] never sold bobbins.”
Id. at 21.  The third invention consisted “of celluloid discs . . . to be attached to certain
sewing machine shuttles.” Id. at 6.  According to Summit Thread’s brief, “[i]nsofar as the
discs were distributed to the public it was a gratuitous distribution.” Id. at 30.  And the
fourth invention consisted of “paper or celluloid discs to be attached to all bobbins used by
[Summit Thread].” Id. at 31.  Corthell maintained that the value of this invention was its
unrealized potential to allow Summit Thread to attach a disc to the bobbins it manufac-
tured and distributed to its customers without violating a patent by one of Summit
Thread’s competitors.  Brief of the Plaintiff, supra note 241, at 22–23.  The invention was
never patented and neither Summit Thread nor any other company manufactured or used
it, apart from one made for an experimental trial, which failed.  Brief for the Defendant,
supra note 232, at 32.
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Clearly, Summit Thread believed that Corthell’s previous inven-
tions were sufficiently valuable to warrant paying him $3500 and
negotiating a contract renewal that included a clause entitling Summit
Thread to Corthell’s future inventions during the contract term.243
Even if Corthell could observe the inventions’ gross market value,
Corthell would not know Summit Thread’s costs and revenues and
thus would have great difficulty verifying the net market value of the
inventions to a court.  Since neither party expected that Summit
Thread would sell Corthell’s inventions (and in fact none of them
were ever sold), no objective measure of their value would be avail-
able.  Instead, their value to Summit Thread’s revenue stream would
have to be distinguished from the many other inputs that contribute to
Summit Thread’s sales revenues.  The complexity and subjectivity of
such an evaluation would invite litigation over value as well as stra-
tegic attempts by both parties to either inflate or deflate the value
assessment.  Contract design theory thus provides a plausible explana-
tion for why a commercial party such as Summit Thread,244 in this
situation, would prefer not to condition performance under such a
contract on difficult-to-verify private information.
Defending the literal interpretation of the word “entirely,” how-
ever, also requires a demonstration that a sophisticated person in
Corthell’s position plausibly could have given the word “entirely” a
literal interpretation as well.  There are several plausible reasons why
Corthell might have agreed to turn over his future inventions without
requiring Summit Thread to make a legally enforceable promise to
pay for them.  First, Summit Thread had already demonstrated its will-
ingness to pay him for such inventions in the past.  In the same agree-
ment in which he promised to turn over his future inventions, Corthell
received a payment of $3500 for inventions already submitted to
Summit Thread.  This earlier interaction revealed Summit Thread’s
propensity to reciprocate and created an element of trust in the rela-
tionship.245  Second, the agreement between Corthell and Summit
243 Corthell, 167 A. at 80.
244 See infra note 250 (explaining why Summit Thread is sophisticated commercial
party).
245 See Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, supra note 9, at 1682–83 (discussing appar-
ently widespread prevalence of “comfort agreements” in which parties use legally unen-
forceable agreements to learn about each side’s propensity to reciprocate).  Recall that the
experimental evidence shows that a preference for reciprocity can motivate cooperation
even in arm’s length interactions.  This evidence shows that many people behave in a recip-
rocal manner by responding cooperatively to generous acts, and, conversely, punishing
noncooperative behavior.  The observed preference for reciprocity is heterogeneous.  Scott
& Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements, supra note 11, at 565–66 (discussing
reciprocity theory and concluding that “this is a heterogeneous world where some people
exhibit reciprocal fairness and others are selfish” and that “[t]aking all the experiments
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Thread constituted a repeat-play game in which Summit Thread’s
defection from its nonlegal commitment to pay Corthell the reason-
able value of his inventions could be punished by Corthell’s refusal to
produce more inventions during the remainder of the contract
period.246  Because the contract placed him under no obligation to
create inventions, Corthell could protect himself by electing to with-
draw from the relationship.247  In many contexts, the norm of reci-
procity and the prospect of repeat dealings are the best available
means of regulating the contractual relationship.248  In short, as a gen-
eral matter, Corthell had good reason to believe that his contract with
Summit Thread was self-enforcing and that Summit Thread would
honor its commitment even if not legally required to do so.
In sum, it is plausible that Summit Thread and Corthell might
have concluded that the difficulty in verifying the value of the inven-
tions made the option of legal enforcement more costly than the alter-
native of informal (or relational) enforcement.249  While it is clear that
the shared contractual end of the parties was for Summit Thread to
pay Corthell the reasonable value of the inventions he created during
the contract period, it seems equally clear that the parties had good
reason to choose nonlegal means to achieve those ends.  Regardless of
whether they did so, the important point is that, for the reasons dis-
cussed above, sophisticated commercial parties would prefer that
courts preserve the choice between informal and formal enforcement,
a choice that requires courts both to give full effect to express terms
and to adhere to the nonenforcement doctrines of indefiniteness and
together . . . the fraction of fair subjects ranges from forty to sixty percent as does the
fraction of subjects who are selfish”); see also Fehr, Gachter & Kirchsteiger, supra note
133, at 850 (noting that “reciprocal motivations have important implications for the
enforcement of contracts” and that “[i]n view of the powerful behavioral impact and effi-
ciency consequences of reciprocity . . . it seems doubtful that one can design optimal incen-
tive contracts on the basis of a neglect of reciprocal motivations”); Fehr & Schmidt, supra
note 133, at 818 (“Some pieces of evidence suggest that many people are driven by fairness
considerations[;] other pieces indicate that virtually all people behave as if completely
selfish . . . .”).
246 When parties contemplate making a series of contracts, neither party will breach an
early contract if the gains from that breach are lower than the expected profits from future
contracts that a breach would eliminate. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
247 Moreover, if Summit Thread’s promise is interpreted as illusory and therefore unen-
forceable, any return promise made by Corthell would likewise be unenforceable. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 18, 71 (1981) (establishing key doctrine
that promise unsupported by return promise or performance is unenforceable).
248 See supra Part II.B.1 (analyzing parties’ motivations in Hunt Foods v. Doliner, 270
N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1966)).
249 Moreover, Corthell could limit the risk of Summit Thread’s breach of their informal
agreement by reducing his efforts to develop future inventions until Summit Thread paid
him the reasonable value of inventions as he produced them seriatim.
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illusory promises.250  This prediction from contract design theory is
supported by the available evidence.  Once again, New York and
California are exemplars of the differences in the evolution of con-
tract common law in the various states.  The strong preference of
sophisticated parties for New York contract law is consistent with our
claim that these parties prefer an adjudication system that faithfully
and consistently applies formal doctrine, absent the parties’ express
indication otherwise at the time of formation.251  New York generally
adheres to formal contract doctrine and, in particular, adheres to the
plain meaning rule of interpretation.252  On the other hand, California
law, notably disfavored by commercial parties, rejects the common
law plain meaning rule in lieu of a rule of interpretation that relies on
contextual evidence to ascribe meaning to express terms.253  This clear
250 According to our working definition of a “sophisticated commercial party,” see supra
note 6, Summit Thread is a sophisticated commercial party but Corthell is not.  For pur-
poses of illustration, however, we presume that Corthell was represented by counsel, and
thus his contract does not fall outside the scope of our thesis.  Our claim that sophisticated
commercial parties would prefer formal doctrine to apply to agreements like the one in
Corthell is buttressed by substantial evidence that many parties to long-term, collaborative
supply contracts choose to create agreements based on illusory promises that are legally
unenforceable. See, e.g., Stanadyne Corp., Deere & Co. and Stanadyne Corp. Long Term
Agreement (Form 10-K, Exhibit 10.15), at § IV.F (Mar. 28, 2002), available at http://www
.secinfo.com/dRsjx.33q.c.htm.  The contract between Deere and Stanadyne is not legally
enforceable because it does not actually require that the parties do anything.  Although the
contract does refer to anticipated levels of Deere purchases, Stanadyne does not have to
produce any parts, and if it does produce them, Deere is under no obligation to take them.
Thus, the promises are illusory.  The parties in the Deere-Stanadyne contract could easily
have written a legally enforceable supply contract.  The parsimonious conclusion is that
they chose to avoid legally enforceable commitments and instead chose to rely largely on
relational enforcement:
[T]he Deere-Stanadyne contract resembles a more famous contract that, over
the years, has been the focus of a great deal of academic attention:  the
General Motors-Fisher Body supply contract for the supply of auto bodies to
GM in the 1920s.  As Victor Goldberg has recently shown, the General
Motors-Fisher Body supply contract was, in truth, legally unenforceable
[because GM’s promise was illusory].
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation:  Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 477 (2009) (citing
Victor P. Goldberg, Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel?  The GM-Fisher Body Contract, 17
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1071, 1076 (2008)).  GM and Fisher Body apparently chose to
rely on a variety of relational mechanisms instead of legal enforcement.
251 See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
252 See, e.g., Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 538 Madison Realty Co., 807 N.E.2d 876, 879 (N.Y.
2004) (“When interpreting contracts, we have repeatedly applied the ‘familiar and emi-
nently sensible proposition of law [ ] that, when parties set down their agreement in a clear,
complete document, their writing should . . . be enforced according to its terms.’” (altera-
tions in original)); In re Wallace v. 600 Partners Co., 658 N.E.2d 715, 717 (N.Y. 1995)
(stating that plain meaning rule imparts stability to commercial and property transactions
“where commercial certainty is a paramount concern”).
253 See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
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choice-of-law preference evinces the degree to which sophisticated
parties (who are able to access the forum of their choice) value the
plain meaning interpretation of their express contract terms.
D. Excuse of Conditions and Rules Versus Standards
Corthell illustrates how courts can subvert formal doctrines by
manipulating the process of contractual interpretation and applying
those formal doctrines in a manner that covertly overrides formal con-
tract terms.  In this case, the court used interpretation to avoid appli-
cation of the illusory promise doctrine to the parties’ contract.  We
have argued that the Corthell court felt constrained to circumvent the
contract’s formal terms in order to maintain fidelity to the parties’
intended ends at the time of formation.  But the Corthell decision
could also be explained as an application of the ex post forfeiture
norm as embodied in the equitable doctrine governing excuse of con-
ditions.  On this view, the question of whether Corthell knowingly
took the risk of forfeiture when he entered into the agreement would
be irrelevant.  Equitable excuse doctrine permits a court to invalidate
express conditions “[t]o the extent that the nonoccurrence of a condi-
tion would cause disproportionate forfeiture . . . unless its occurrence
was a material part of the agreed exchange.”254  According to this ex
post version, the court simply refused to enforce a term that clearly
created a condition of the promisor’s obligation because the court
believed that the condition was not a material part of the parties’
agreement, and thus its enforcement would impose a substantial reli-
ance loss on Corthell.  Courts regard such losses as forfeitures and the
resulting gains for the promisor as a form of unjust enrichment.255
The excuse account of the Corthell decision requires an explana-
tion for why the court would determine that the express condition was
not a material term of the parties’ agreement.  Although the court
does not provide an explicit account of how the excuse doctrine
applies to the case, the reasons that explain the ex ante account also
explain why the court would have reached the same conclusion under
the excuse doctrine.  If a court fails to appreciate the information bar-
riers to legal enforcement and the role that relational mechanisms can
play in enforcing commitments that are not legally binding, it would
understandably fail to see why a term granting unfettered discretion
to determine the reasonable value of the promisor’s performance was
254 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981).
255 See, e.g., id. § 371; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 3 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§§ 12.19, 12.20a (3d ed. 2004).  For discussion of forfeitures, see cases cited in note 207
supra.
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material to the design of the contract.  As we have explained above,
the Corthell court appeared to treat that term as anomalous, which
suggests that the court did not regard it as material.
The above recharacterization of Corthell provides one illustration
of how the doctrine governing excuse of conditions is premised on
reasoning that fails to appreciate the role of intended contractual
means in contract design.  However, the degree to which the
antiforfeiture norm undermines the structure of ex ante contractual
intent can best be shown by the official illustrations included in § 229
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  Unlike Corthell, each of
these illustrations expressly embraces the excuse doctrine.  Consider
the first illustration, loosely based on the celebrated case of Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent:256
A contracts to build a house for B, using pipe of Reading manufac-
ture.  In return, B agrees to pay $75,000 in progress payments, each
payment to be made “on condition that no pipe other than that of
Reading manufacture has been used.”  Without A’s knowledge, a
subcontractor mistakenly uses pipe of Cohoes manufacture which is
identical in quality and is distinguishable only by the name of the
manufacturer which is stamped on it.  The mistake is not discovered
until the house is completed, when replacement of the pipe will
require destruction of substantial parts of the house.  B refuses to
pay the unpaid balance of $10,000.  A court may conclude that the
use of Reading rather than Cohoes pipe is so relatively unimportant
to B that the forfeiture that would result from denying A the entire
balance would be disproportionate, and may allow recovery by A
subject to any claim for damages for A’s breach of his duty to use
Reading pipe.257
The key to the application of the excuse doctrine in this illustra-
tion is the conclusion that the use of Reading pipe is “relatively unim-
portant” to B.258  So the question presented in this stylized version of
Jacob & Youngs is whether the court is correct in concluding that the
condition was not material when the parties included it in their agree-
ment.  Implicit in the reasoning of the Restatement is the view that
the condition is self-evidently nonmaterial on the facts as stated:  No
256 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).  The Restatement omits facts critical to the outcome of the
actual case. See discussion of those differences infra note 261.
257 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1981).
258 Note that under § 229, the court can excuse the condition only if the parties regarded
the condition as nonmaterial at the time of formation.  The mere fact that the actual failure
to satisfy the condition does not materially affect the promisor’s interests ex post is irrele-
vant. Id. § 229 cmt. c.  The question is not whether “the actual non-occurrence [of the
condition that Reading pipe must be used] happened to involve a departure that was not a
material part of the agreed exchange, [but rather whether] the occurrence of the condition
was a material part of that exchange.” Id.
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reasonable person would believe that the condition of using Reading
brand pipe was material to B because the Cohoes brand pipe that was
in fact used “is identical in quality and distinguishable only by the
name of the manufacturer which is stamped on it.”259  This reasoning,
however, begs the question of why the parties chose to make B’s pay-
ment obligations expressly conditional on A’s installation of Reading
brand pipes only, instead of simply including a promise by A to use
Reading pipe, thereby subjecting it only to damages for any losses
caused by its use of nonconforming pipe.
It is, of course, possible that the drafting was careless or made in
ignorance of the legal implications of making a contractual obligation
a condition rather than a promise.  But such a conclusion would
require some objective evidence to override the strong presumption
that commercially sophisticated parties such as A, the contractor,
exercise reasonable care in executing their agreements and know or
should know the legal implications of the express contractual language
to which they agree.  Instead, the Restatement illustration invites the
court to excuse the condition if it believes that the promisor did not
regard the condition as relatively important at the time of agreement,
even though the court concedes that the parties deliberately chose to
create a condition instead of a promise.  Such reasoning can be
explained only by a deep-seated per se policy against the enforcement
of conditions that create a forfeiture ex post.260  The difficulty is that
commercial parties have sound reasons for creating express condi-
259 Id. § 229 cmt. b, illus. 1.
260 This point is underscored by an analysis of the other illustrations in Restatement
§ 229.  For example, consider the second illustration of § 229, based on Del. Steel Co. v.
Clamar S.S. Corp., 378 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1967). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 229 cmt. b, illus. 2 & reporter’s note (1981).  This illustration, in which a carrier receives
only oral notice of damaged cargo when the contract requires written notice, implies that
express conditions should be subject to a “no prejudice” standard:  They should not be
enforced if their purpose has been served by other means. Id. § 229 cmt. b, illus. 2.  But
§ 229 does not, in fact, permit courts to set conditions aside based on a purely ex post “no
prejudice” standard.  As we have seen, the doctrine requires that the condition not have
been regarded as material by the parties at the time of formation.  In this case, the parties
had ample reason ex ante to regard the condition as a material component of their agree-
ment.  The third, fourth, and fifth illustrations of § 229 each constitute variations on the
theme of excusing the timing of the occurrence of a condition. Id. § 229 cmt. c, illus. 3–5.
The Restatement says that a court may excuse the nonoccurrence of a condition “during
the period of time in which it would otherwise have to occur, if it concludes that the time of
its occurrence is not a material part of the agreed exchange.  This conclusion is sometimes
summed up by the phrase that ‘time is not of the essence.’” Id. § 229 cmt. c (1981) (cita-
tions omitted).  Even if parties expressly condition an obligation on a timing requirement
and expressly state that the timing requirement is of the essence, equitable doctrine per-
mits a court to set aside the condition in order to prevent a forfeiture. See Holiday Inns of
Am., Inc. v. Knight, 450 P.2d 42, 43–45 (Cal. 1969) (excusing failure to comply with timing
requirement where contract expressly made timing requirement essential but enforcement
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tions, and thus courts have good reasons to enforce them.  Indeed, it is
easy to imagine reasons why B might have placed a high value on the
use of Reading brand pipe, even though he knew other brands of
equivalent quality were available.  We argued in Part III that parties
faced with the challenge of specifying performance standards choose
between precise, rule-like terms and vague, standard-like terms.  In
doing so, they trade off front-end specification costs against back-end
verification or enforcement costs.  Even if B’s sole objective was to
ensure the installation of Reading-quality pipe in his house, he might
have intentionally conditioned his payment obligations on the installa-
tion of Reading brand pipe, rather than Reading quality pipe, in order
to lower the expected costs of enforcing that requirement.  A term
requiring Reading quality pipe sets out a standard that places on B the
burden of proving that the pipe installed by the builder does not con-
form with the Reading quality standard.  A term requiring Reading
brand pipe instead sets out a precise rule that allows B to verify per-
formance or nonperformance at relatively low cost.261  Sophisticated
parties wishing to focus more of their contracting costs ex ante would
thus be frustrated with regard to this goal by courts’ invocation of the
excuse of conditions.
E. A Final Equitable Override:  Waiver of Conditions
The final equitable doctrine in direct tension with the formal doc-
trine governing the enforcement of express conditions allows courts to
avoid enforcement of express conditions that courts have acknowl-
edged are undeniably contained in the parties’ agreement and are not
subject to excuse.  The law governing waiver of conditions nonetheless
allows a court to set aside conditions by holding that the promisor has
of condition would have caused forfeiture); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229
cmt. c, illus. 4 (1981) (based on Holiday Inns of America).
261 It is also possible that B had other, atypical reasons for preferring the brand.  Per-
haps he was skeptical of claims that other brands were “just as good.”  Or perhaps he had
an emotional, reputational, or business reason for preferring Reading brand pipe over pipe
of equivalent quality.  To be sure, in the actual case, Kent’s payment obligations were con-
ditioned not just on the use of Reading brand pipe, but on Jacob & Youngs’ exact con-
formity with all the specifications in the building plans. See SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 3,
at 71 (excerpting original contract language).  That fact makes both of the above accounts
questionable.  Indeed, because the condition applied to all specifications rather than just a
few, Jacob & Youngs might plausibly be seen as having actually enforced the condition as
written but as having interpreted the express condition to require the installation of
Reading quality, rather than Reading brand, pipe.  So interpreted, Jacob & Youngs did not
breach and actually satisfied the condition.  The facts in the illustration, however, state
only that B’s payment obligation is conditioned on the use of Reading brand pipe.  On the
facts so described, there is no justification either for interpreting the condition to require
installation of Reading quality pipe or for setting aside the condition.
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waived the condition.  A promisor can waive a condition explicitly by
promising that he will not enforce it, even if he receives no considera-
tion in return.  Or a promisor can waive a condition implicitly by
failing to object if the promisee fails to satisfy it or by performing
despite the nonoccurrence of the condition.262
The doctrine of waiver illustrates how equitable reasoning can
undermine judicial respect for express terms that clearly indicate the
parties’ determination to avoid the application of equitable doctrines
to their agreement. Fritts v. Cloud Oak Flooring Co.263 provides a
paradigmatic example.  In Fritts, a commercial landlord and commer-
cial tenant entered into a commercial lease agreement that granted
the landlord the right to terminate the lease after ten days following
the tenant’s default and the landlord’s written notice of default.264
The lease also expressly provided an antiwaiver clause and a time-is-
of-the-essence clause.265  The tenant originally fell behind in rent in
late 1968 but subsequently arranged for payment of arrears.266  For
the next year, the tenant paid in full each month but on ten occasions
failed to pay by the first of the month, usually paying a few days there-
262 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmts. a & b (1981) (discussing
waiver rationale for rule that promise to perform despite nonoccurrence of condition is
generally binding); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, § 8.5 (describing excuse of condition by
waiver).
263 478 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).  Waiver by election bars the promisor from
defending its own failure to perform on the ground that the promisee had previously failed
to satisfy a condition of the promisor’s prior performance. SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 3,
at 656.  Waiver by estoppel bars the promisor from refusing to perform on the ground that
the promisor had, implicitly or explicitly, waived not only in the past but in the future as
well. Id.
264 478 S.W.2d at 9–10.  The court described the commercial parties to this dispute as
follows:
[P]laintiff L. C. Fritts d/b/a B & C Leasing Service (the landlord) sought resti-
tution of certain leased premises, to wit, a tract in Springfield and the business
building situate thereon, together with double the monthly rents and profits of
said premises, because (so it was alleged in plaintiff’s petition filed on January
9, 1970) “the lease . . . was terminated at January 1, 1970, for failure of defen-
dant [Cloud Oak Flooring Company, a corporation, the lessee-tenant] to pay
the rental reserved.” Plaintiff-landlord appeals from the judgment for defen-
dant-tenant.
Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
265 According to the court,
Paragraph 25 [of the contract] stated that no failure of the landlord to exercise
any power given him under the lease, or to insist upon strict compliance by the
tenant with its obligations thereunder, and no custom or practice of the parties
at variance with the terms of the lease should constitute a waiver of the land-
lord’s right to demand exact compliance with the terms thereof.  [P]aragraph
26 [of the contract] declared that “[t]ime is of the essence of this agreement.”
Id. at 10.
266 Id. at 10.
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after.267  The landlord accepted these payments without objection
until January 1970, when he returned the tenant’s check dated January
5, 1970, and instituted an unlawful detainer action.268
The court found that the landlord had accepted and cashed “ten
consecutive tardy monthly rental payments . . . [without ever warning]
the tenant of his intention to seek a forfeiture of the leasehold estate
for any future tardiness in payment.”269  The court then held that, not-
withstanding the time-is-of-the-essence and antiwaiver clauses, this
conduct constituted a waiver of the landlord’s right to terminate upon
late payment without first providing advance notice of his intention to
strictly enforce the payment deadline.  The court stated that “[b]y the
mere act of including an essence provision . . . the landlord did not
immunize or insulate himself from the legal effect and consequence
[of cashing the tardy checks].”270  It then quoted Corbin for the pro-
position that
a provision that an express condition of a promise or promises in
the contract cannot be eliminated by waiver, or by conduct consti-
tuting an estoppel, is wholly ineffective.  The promisor still has the
power to waive the condition, or by his conduct to estop himself
from insisting upon it, to the same extent that he would have had
this power if there had been no such provision.271
Fritts is a dramatic illustration of the pervasive effect of the law
governing waiver of conditions.  The law of waiver permits courts to
ignore the parties’ expressed intentions even when parties draft meta-
terms providing clear instructions to courts about how they intend the
express terms in their agreement to be interpreted.  Application of the
waiver doctrine in the face of such meta-terms undermines the ability
of parties to control the interpretation, and thus the design, of their
agreements.272  To see why, consider the late rental payments in Fritts.
Suppose that the parties expect that late payments will sometimes
occur under conditions where the expected value of the loss to the
landlord is low.  At other times, a late payment can impose a substan-
tial expected loss.  Ideally, the parties would condition the landlord’s
267 Id. at 10–11.
268 Id. at 11.
269 Id. at 13.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 14 (quoting 3A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS:  A COM-
PREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 763, at 531 (1960)).
272 See Pa. Ave. Dev. Corp. v. One Parcel of Land, 670 F.2d 289, 292–94 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(granting commercial tenant larger share of condemnation award so as to prevent forfei-
ture, notwithstanding explicit terms of condemnation clause).  For discussion, see Victor P.
Goldberg, Thomas H. Merrill & Daniel Unumb, Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent
Domain:  Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant,
34 UCLA L. Rev. 1083, 1120–25 (1987).
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right to terminate on a late payment that causes the landlord to suffer
a large loss.  However, the size of the loss caused by any given late
payment is likely to be observable but not verifiable—the expected
costs to the landlord of proving the loss in court are likely to be
greater than the expected benefits of litigation.  Under these circum-
stances, parties reasonably might agree to give the landlord an uncon-
ditional right to terminate, subject to the legally unenforceable (but
relationally enforceable) understanding that the landlord will not
exercise this right unless the expected loss caused by the late payment
is large.273  But given the existence of the equitable doctrines gov-
erning waiver of conditions, the only way for the parties to achieve
this result is to indicate expressly their desire to prevent these doc-
trines from being applied to their agreement.  This is the only possible
purpose to be served by including the “time-is-of-the-essence” and
“antiwaiver” clauses in an agreement.  Thus, when sophisticated com-
mercial parties include these express clauses in their agreements,
there is simply no justification for the judicial practice of refusing to
enforce them on equitable grounds.
In short, when sophisticated commercial parties incur costs to
cast obligations expressly in a written and unconditional form, they do
so to permit a party to stand on its rights under the written contract
when doing so is necessary to protect the party from incurring a sub-
stantial loss.  But sometimes the only way to make such a right practi-
cally effective is to make it unconditionally enforceable.  Thus, when
sophisticated commercial parties create express conditions and then
include an express clause unmistakably prohibiting waiver of those
conditions by subsequent conduct, short of modification, there are
good reasons for courts to enforce those conditions strictly.  The
theory of contract design therefore teaches that ex ante efficient con-
tracts may sometimes result in forfeiture ex post.  To abhor a forfei-
ture is to abhor the formal contract doctrines that make it possible for
commercial parties to design their contracts efficiently.  By seeking to
redistribute losses ex post, the antiforfeiture doctrines not only under-
273 The argument here parallels our argument above that, in Hunt Foods, Doliner might
rationally have agreed to give Hunt Foods an unconditional option subject to the legally
unenforceable condition that Hunt Foods will not exercise its option unless Doliner shops
its bid.  See supra Part II.B.  Thus, the landlord’s commitment is relationally enforceable
because typically he will be a repeat player with an interest in preserving his reputation
and social esteem.  In addition, as we explained above, “[e]xperimental evidence shows
that a preference for reciprocity—the willingness to reward cooperation and to punish self-
ishness—can motivate cooperation even in arms-length interactions between complete
strangers.” See supra note 133.  Finally, because commercial real estate attorneys who
represent landlords are repeat players in their locality, they can bond their clients’ nonlegal
commitments with their reputations.
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mine efficient contract design but may also unfairly deprive one party
of gains that it paid to retain in order to compensate another party for
losses that it was paid to bear.
CONCLUSION
The current two-stage regime of contract adjudication treats
formal contract terms as prima facie instructions that can be set aside
when necessary to vindicate the parties’ contractual ends.  In this
Article, we have sought to demonstrate why sophisticated commercial
parties would instead prefer a regime that strictly enforces formal con-
tract terms absent an express invitation for judicial intervention.  Our
argument is premised on the fundamental distinction between the par-
ties’ intended contractual means and their intended contractual ends.
Contractual means are the mechanisms by which commercial parties
create contracts designed to best achieve their intended ends.  Preser-
vation of the efficacy of these means requires a regime in which courts
adhere to the formal doctrines governing contractual interpretation
and resist the temptation to vindicate contractual ends irrespective of
the parties’ chosen contractual means.  However well-intentioned the
instinct to soften the hard edge of formal legal rules, it is ultimately
self-defeating:  This instinct may redistribute risks the parties were
paid to bear, and, in any event, it undermines efficient contract design.
Contracts that otherwise might seem inexplicable can be rational-
ized in light of the principal tradeoffs parties face in designing con-
tracts efficiently.  Because commercial parties often prefer to
condition their performance obligations on events that are observable
but not easily verifiable, in many cases they will rely on both legal and
relational enforcement to regulate different obligations arising out of
a single agreement.  By using express terms and invoking interpretive
rules such as the parol evidence rule and the doctrine of integration,
parties can partition their agreement into legal and relational seg-
ments.  When they do so, they knowingly expose themselves to the
risk that they will have no legal recourse should their counterparty
breach an obligation governed only by the relational norms of their
agreement.  With respect to the legally enforceable terms of the agree-
ment, contract design theory explains that parties face the further
choice between using their superior knowledge of their contractual
ends to specify precisely the terms of the contract ex ante or to dele-
gate to a court with the benefit of hindsight the task of selecting an
appropriate proxy for the contract performance ex post.  The former
strategy motivates parties to use express terms with a plain meaning to
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create contractual rules that confine the discretion of a court in subse-
quent litigation.
The challenges of contract design thus require parties to use
various combinations of legal and relational norms, as well as contrac-
tual rules and standards, to optimize their contract in light of uncer-
tainty about the future and the difficulties of proof.  But they can do
this efficiently only if courts reliably apply the formal interpretive doc-
trines of contract law.  Since design choices are best made by the par-
ties ex ante, our theory holds that commercial parties would prefer a
regime in which the second stage of the two-stage adjudicatory
system—an inheritance of the centuries-old conflict between law and
equity—is invoked only if specifically requested.
Our argument has been largely based on theory, but there is
growing evidence to support the claim that commercial parties in fact
exhibit the preferences that theory predicts.  For example, a common
provision in many alliance agreements specifies the parties’ express
preference that courts resolve any disputes by relying exclusively on
formal interpretive rules.274  In addition to anecdotal evidence from
individual contracts, Lisa Bernstein has shown that parties who are
members of trade associations—and thus who rely on both relational
enforcement and third party enforcement—carefully preserve formal
contract doctrine and reject equitable principles in assessing perform-
ance, breach, and liability.275  Bernstein argues that this single-stage
regime can best be understood as a mechanism for preserving the
space for both formal and relational norms to operate.  Finally, as we
have suggested above, recent work by Eisenberg and Miller that
showed strong party preferences for selecting New York over
California for both choice of law and choice of forum clauses provides
274 See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. and EarthShell Corp., Alliance Agreement
art. 12(h), at 7 (July 25, 2002), http://contracts.onecle.com/earthshell/dupont.collab.2002
.07.25.shtml.  The Agreement reads:
The Parties’ legal obligations under this Alliance Agreement are to be deter-
mined from the precise and literal language of this Alliance Agreement and
not from the imposition of state laws attempting to impose additional duties of
good faith, fair dealing or fiduciary obligations that were not the express basis
of the bargain at the time this Agreement was made.
The Parties are sophisticated business entities with legal counsel that have
been retained to review the terms of this Alliance Agreement and the Parties
represent that they have fully read this Alliance Agreement, and understand
and accept its terms.
Id.
275 Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 130, at 1735–37 (describing formal-
istic approach adopted by cotton industry arbitration tribunals); see generally Bernstein,
Merchant Law, supra note 130 (describing formalistic adjudicative methods of National
Grain and Feed Association arbitrators and why merchants find this approach to adjudica-
tion preferable).
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further support for the claim that commercial parties prefer interpre-
tations based on the formal doctrines of the common law.276  The sig-
nificance of this striking differential in party preference is shown by
Miller’s analysis of the differences in contract law between New York
and California:  New York uses formal doctrine to enforce bargains
strictly and displays little tolerance of equitable principles that seek to
balance interests ex post;277  California, by contrast, is far more willing
to revise contracts ex post on the grounds of fairness, equity, or public
policy.  Miller concludes that “[t]he revealed preferences of sophisti-
cated parties support arguments by Schwartz, Scott[,] and others that
formalistic rules offer superior value for the interpretation and
enforcement of commercial contracts.”278
The cornerstone of contractual interpretation is respect for the
parties’ contractual intent.  But judicial respect for the parties’ con-
tractual intent entails fidelity to the doctrines on which parties must
rely to select the contractual means for pursuing their contractual
ends.  Under the current two-stage regime, courts presume that the
parties intended them to realign their contract terms with their con-
tractual ends whenever the parties’ formal contract terms either never
did, or no longer do, constitute a rational means of pursuing those
ends.  Indeed, as the law of conditions dramatically illustrates, courts
sometimes treat this presumption as conclusive by refusing to give
effect to express contractual language directing courts not to apply
equitable doctrine to their agreement.  We have argued, however,
that, at least between sophisticated commercial parties, this presump-
tion is rarely, if ever, justified.  Although commercial parties might
sometimes find it rational to delegate such discretion to courts, they
would prefer an adjudicative regime that gives them the option of
using contract design strategies that are effective only if courts will
reliably enforce the contract’s formal terms, even when such enforce-
ment produces a result radically misaligned with the parties’ contrac-
tual ends.  Such an adjudicative regime requires courts to reject the
276 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 148, at 19, 34 (discussing study showing over 40%
of parties in large data base preferred New York for choice of law and choice of forum
clauses as against only 8% and 7% selecting California for choice of law and choice of
forum clauses, respectively).
277 Miller, supra note 146, at 5.  In addition to identifying the preference in New York
for strict interpretation of plain language in commercial contracts, a preference for a
“hard” parol evidence rule, and reluctance to grant relief on grounds of mistake or excuse,
Miller reports that “the trend of recent New York cases has been to enforce forfeitures in
the absence of some other grounds for invalidity, such as unconscionability.” Id. at 25
n.139 (citing Fifty States Mgmt. Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 113, 115
(N.Y. 1979) (enforcing provision in lease contract providing for forfeiture by tenant of all
possessory rights upon failure to tender rent payments for two months)).
278 Id. at 1.
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hoary principle that equity trumps formal doctrine and instead equate
the parties’ contractual intent with their chosen contractual means.
Nothing less will satisfy contract law’s foundational commitment to
honoring contractual intent.
